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A Coherent Methodology For First
Amendment Speech and Religion
Clause Cases
Thomas R. McCoy

48 Vand. L. Rev. 1335 (1995)

It seems clear that any deliberateeffort by government to impose religious
orthodoxy will be held unconstitutionalper se. A religiouslymotivated restriction
on disfavored religiouspractices will be held to violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Similarly, a religiously motivated attempt to promote or subsidize favored religiouspractices will be held to violate the EstablishmentClause. These complimentary restrictionsare now so ingrainedin ourpolitical culture that the legislatures
rarely transgressthem.
The problem that has bedeviled the Supreme Court for many years is that
government regulatory schemes and benefit programs designed to serve purely
nonreligious objectives inevitably impact on religion inadvertently. In applying
the FreeExercise Clause to cases of inadvertentinterference, the Court adoptedone
fundamental doctrinal construct, promptly overruled that construct, adopted a
nearly oppositeprinciple, and then years later resurrected the original approach.
In applying the EstablishmentClause, the Court consistently articulatedthe same
principle or "test" over many years, but produced a series of apparently
inconsistentresults. Most recently, the Court has consciously avoided articulating
any standard or "test" in finding that a governmental action violates the
EstablishmentClause.
The task confronting the Court is to develop a coherentjurisprudence to
deal with the frequent inadvertentcollisions between governmentalactions and the
absolute prohibitions of the two religion clauses. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court appears unaware that this is precisely the same systemic jurisprudential
question that is presented when similar regulations inadvertently affect the
interestsprotected by the Free Speech Clause.
It is the central thesis of this Article that the conceptual methodology
developed by the Courtfor dealing with inadvertence in the free speech context is
the only sensible approach to the inadvertenceproblem in the context of any of the
absolutely worded prohibitionsof the FirstAmendment, includingthe two religion
clauses. This Article concludes with an argumentthat those currentthreads in religion clause jurisprudence that appear to parallel the free speech methodology
should be refined and reinforced while those that diverge from the free speech
methodology should be abandoned.

A Coherent Methodology for First
Amendment Speech and Religion
Clause Cases
Thomas R. McCoy*
I. THE SYSTEMIC PROBLEM OF "INADVERTENCE" ..................
II. 'INADVERTENCE" IN RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE..
A.
The Free Exercise Clause .......................................
B.
The Establishment Clause.....................................
III. "INADVERTENCE" IN THE FREE SPEECH CONTEXT-

1335
1344
1344
1351

THE CLARK METHODOLOGY ...............................................
APPLYING THE CLARK METHODOLOGY TO RELIGION

1355

CLAUSE CASES ....................................................................
A.
The FreeExercise Clause .......................................
B.
The Establishment Clause.....................................

1364
1364
1374
1383

IV.

V.

CONCLUSION ......................................................................

I. THE SYSTEMIC PROBLEM OF "INADVERTENCE"
Along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, the two religion
clauses of the First Amendment have been around for over 200 years.
It seems incredible, but the Supreme Court has yet to develop a coherent and consistent approach to the application of these apparently
simple clauses. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the Court
has adopted one fundamental doctrinal construct,1 promptly overruled
that construct, adopted a nearly opposite principle,2 and then years
later resurrected the original approach3
In applying the

*
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I wish to thank my original research
assistant on this project, Cristina Chou, for her clear and concise research memoranda and to
thank her successor, Brad Harvey, for his patient work in tracking down many of the sources
that are cited in the finished product.
1.
Minersville School Districtv. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
2.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1942); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3.
See Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that accidental governmental
interferences with religion present no free exercise problem).
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Establishment Clause, the Court has consistently articulated the
same principle or "test" over many years. 4 In the application of the
test to concrete cases, however, the Court has produced two lines of
decisions. The Court has held that some governmental actions violate
the Establishment Clause, while others do not, without articulating a
principled or even discernible distinction between the constitutional
actions and those held unconstitutional. 5 Most recently, the Court
has consciously avoided articulating any standard or6 "test" in finding
that a state action violates the Establishment Clause.
In addition to its inability to assign coherent meaning to the
two clauses separately, the Court has proved unable to read the two
clauses together in a sensible way. The Court often has read one of
the clauses to require some governmental action that prior cases
suggest is flatly prohibited by the other clause.7 The Court explains
this ultimate bit of incoherence by asserting that there is a certain
amount of tension between the policies underlying the two religion
clauses, thus precluding the development of a completely consistent
jurisprudence for the religion clauses.8
A casual reading of the two religion clauses of the First
Amendment would not suggest such pervasive jurisprudential difficulties. Both clauses were intended to prevent governmental imposition of religious orthodoxy. 9 The Free Exercise Clause directly prohibits the government from using its regulatory powers to restrict individual practice of officially disfavored religions.' 0 The Establishment
For the original articulation of the test, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
4.
(1971).
See, for example, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (holding that the
5.
state may lend books to parochial school students); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
(holding that the state may not constitutionally lend maps, magazines, transparencies and other
similar instructional materials to parochial school students); Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a system of tuition reimbursement and
tax deductions for parents of parochial school students); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
(upholding a similar system of tax deductions).
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992); Board ofEducation of
6.
Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 129 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1994).
See, for example, Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409-10 (holding that a state unemployment
7.
scheme violates free exercise in discrimination against the plaintiff due to her religious beliefs).
8.
'The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses,
both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
The First Amendment, beginning with the words "Congress shall make no law ..
9.
limits only the power of Congress and not that of the states. The Supreme Court, however, has
incorporated the First Amendment, including its religion clauses, into the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ('The
Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress
to enact" laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof).
10. U.S. Const., Amend. 1.

1995]

RELIGION CLAUSE CASES

1337

Clause imposes a parallel prohibition on government, preventing the
government from adopting, endorsing, funding, or otherwise promoting any "official" state religion." While the Free Exercise Clause most
directly articulates the common objective of the two clauses, the
Establishment Clause specifically addresses a form of interference
with religious liberty with which the Framers were most familiar and
for which government historically had demonstrated a particular
propensity.
The two religion clauses, then, are two sides of the same
coin-a single constitutional restriction on the power of government to
interfere with the religious liberty of its citizens. In substance, the
religion clauses are simply a particularly important manifestation of
the basic constitutional premise that the individual is to be left alone
by government unless the government can show a sufficient reason to
justify interfering with the individual's liberty. The religion clauses
embody the express judgment that the religious preferences of the
political majority do not constitute a sufficient reason for the use of
governmental power to restrict the religious preferences of a political
minority.
One would expect that any religiously motivated attempt by a
legislative majority to restrict particular religious preferences would
be invalidated by the Court as a per se violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.12 Similarly, one would expect that any attempt by a legislative majority to endorse or promote an officially approved religious
belief or practice because of the legislature's religious preference for
that belief or practice would be invalidated as a per se violation of the
Establishment Clause. 13 Generally speaking, this proves to be the
case when such issues reach the Supreme Court. Indeed, the notion
of freedom of religion, as a particularly important subset of general
individual liberty, is so engrained in our constitutional culture by now
that such clear-cut cases rarely arise. It is extremely unlikely that a
11.
Id. But see Justices Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and Justice Scalia's dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting), which assert that the Establishment Clause merely

prohibits the endorsement of an official state religion.
12. See Churchof Lukami Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472
(1993) (presenting the question of what to do with intentional governmental interferences with
religion). Unfortunately, the various members of the Court couched even this apparently simple
proposition in confusing terms. See note 100 for a more detailed discussion of the confusing
rhetoric in a number of the Hialeahopinions.
13. See School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(invalidating a requirement that passages from the Bible be read or that the Lord's Prayer be

recited in public schools at the beginning of each day, even though individual students could be
excused upon written request from a parent).
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state legislature or the federal Congress would prohibit individuals
from maintaining a particular religious belief or acting on that belief
simply because the legislative majority subscribes to a conflicting
theological viewpoint. 14 For the same reason, it is extremely unlikely
that Congress or any state legislature would be moved to adopt or
endorse any particular formal religion as the official or established
state religion.

15

A form of classic or clear establishment clause case does arise
somewhat more frequently than the classic free exercise case, however, because of numerous manifestations of "generic" religion in
various formal government functions. Sessions of Congress and many
state legislatures are opened with an "invocation" by a priest or minister, public school commencements and other similar solemn state
occasions often include such an "invocation," our money carries the
motto "In God We Trust," and even the" congressionally mandated
form of the "Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag" contains the phrase
"under God."'6 It seems that consistent adherence to underlying establishment clause principles would require that these overt governmental endorsements of generic religion be invalidated as per se
violations of the Establishment Clause. It is hard to see these governmental pronouncements as anything other than an official
preference for one theological viewpoint (the existence of and
potential for intervention by a god) over the contrary theological
7
viewpoint (atheism).
In spite of the obviously religious origins of these common
conventions,8 the Supreme Court has refused to excise them from
14. But see Hialeah,which Justice Souter in concurrence characterizes as "a rare example
of a law actually aimed at suppressing religious exercise." 113 S. Ct. at 2243 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Hialeah observes that: "[It] is only in
the rare case that a state or local legislature will enact a law directly burdening religious
practice as such." Id. at 2251 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
15. It is more likely that legislatures will attempt to promote generic religion over
nonreligion. The recent resurgence of the school prayer movement seems to exemplify this
inclination. See, for example, Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 977 F.2d 963
(5th Cir. 1992) (upholding a school district resolution that allowed students to deliver a
nonsectarian, nonproseletyzing invocation since the prayer would serve the secular purpose of
solemnizing the occasion). But see Harrisv. Joint School DistrictNo. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that a prayer at a public high school violated the Establishment Clause).
16. H.R.J. Res. 243, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
17. The government arguably has supported religion by recognizing Thanksgiving and
Christmas as national holidays. One might justify this practice by claiming that these holidays
have become secularized, minimizing their religious content. On the other hand, one might
argue that the days are unavoidably religious, a kind of "cultural residue" of their religious
origins.
18. See, for example, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding a state
legislature's practice of opening its sessions with a prayer).
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governmental activity. Since a refusal to invalidate these obvious
governmental manifestations of religion cannot be satisfactorily
reconciled with the express prohibition of the Establishment Clause
by any course of reasoning or doctrinal development, these holdings
generally are viewed as exceptions to the establishment clause
requirements. The exceptions often are characterized as covering "de
minimis" instances of government endorsement or as historic
governmental practices that have largely lost their religious
significance or at least have proven not to lead the government into
further involvement with religion. 19 However one characterizes the
exceptions for doctrinal purposes, it seems clear that the Court has
chosen to ignore or overlook certain well-established, and in the
Court's view harmless, violations of the basic establishment clause
principle. When these historic or de minimis practices are set to one
side, religiously motivated governmental endorsement of religion is
almost as rare as religiously motivated governmental restrictions on
religious liberty. Thus, with the exception of the de minimis or
historic cases, classic establishment clause cases are as unlikely in
our current political culture as are classic free exercise cases.
At this level, it is fair to say that the religion clauses impose an
absolute prohibition against legislative attempts to aid or restrict

19. In Marsh, for example, the Court refused to invalidate Nebraska's practice of opening
sessions of its legislature with a prayer. Id. at 792-95. The opinion noted that Congress had
opened its sessions with prayers for almost two hundred years and that courts, including the
Supreme Court itself, open with the statement, "God save the United States and this Honorable
Court." Id. at 786-88. The Court opined that long history supported these practices: "Standing
alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees,
but there is far more here than simply historical patterns. In this context, historical evidence
sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but
also on how they thought the Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First
Congress-their actions reveal their intent." Id. at 790. In her concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), Justice O'Connor approved of the practices of declaring
Thanksgiving a national holiday, printing "In God We Trust" on coins, and opening court sessions with the words, "God save the United States and this Honorable Court." According to
Justice O'Connor, "tihose government acknowledgements of religion serve, in the only ways
reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society. For that reason, and because of their history and ubiquity, those practices are not understood as conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs." Id.
at 693.
Concurring in the same case, Justice Brennan defended the designation of "In God We
Trust" as our national motto and references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance as forms of
"ceremonial deism," which, through rote repetition, had lost any significant religious content.
Id. at 716. "Moreover, these references are uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge
in a manner that simply could not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to
purely nonreligious phrases." Id. at 717.
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religion and that by-and-large (again setting aside the de minimis
exceptions) the legislatures are conditioned to respect the prohibition.
The Supreme Court seems more than ready to enforce the prohibition
against the occasional legislative foray into the area of religious
preference. 20 Invoking the imagery popularized by Thomas Jefferson,
our political system is characterized by a "wall of separation between
church and state."2 '
If this all seems so clear, so elementary, what is the problem
that has bedeviled the Supreme Court throughout the history of religion clause litigation? If, indeed, the underlying value of freedom of
religion is so engrained in our political culture that the legislatures
rarely transgress, how has the Court made such a mess of religion
clause jurisprudence? The problem, quite simply, is that governmental regulatory schemes and benefit programs designed to serve purely
nonreligious governmental objectives inevitably impact on religion
accidentally or inadvertently. As government becomes a larger and
more pervasive factor in our daily lives, inadvertent collisions between purely secular governmental actions and religion clause values
22
become increasingly frequent.

In an earlier era characterized by little governmental regulation of individual conduct, it was less likely that one of those governmental regulations would restrict individual conduct that happened to
result from an individual's religious beliefs. But with today's far more
pervasive governmental regulation of individual conduct, it is inevitable that some of those regulations will reach conduct that for some
individuals is religiously motivated. For example, the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") was passed by Congress to readjust the relative economic power of labor and management in contract negotiations. 2 3 Nothing in the purpose or legislative history of the NLRA

gives the slightest suggestion that it was intended to restrict or impede any religious belief or conduct because of a religious preference

20. See Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2217 (all nine Justices found ordinances prohibiting ritual
slaughter of animals to be unconstitutional).
21. 8 Jeff. Works 113.
22. "As the state's interest in the individual becomes more comprehensive, its concerns
and the concerns of religion perforce overlap. State codes and the dictates of faith touch the
same activities. Both aim at human good, and in their respective views of what is good for man
they may concur or they may conflict. No constitutional command which leaves religion free
can avoid this quality of interplay." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23. See Linda L. Rippey, Alternatives to the United States System of Labor Relations: A
Comparative Analysis of the Labor Relations Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany,
Japan,and Sweden, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 627, 628-29 (1988) (providing an overview of the NLRA).
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of the legislature. Thus, there is no clear free exercise problem and
our "wall" of separation between church and state is not directly
threatened by the NLRA. In most of its applications the NLRA has no
impact at all on religious beliefs or practices. But if the NLRA is
applied to the relationship between teachers and administrators at
parochial schools, still in pursuit of the purely economic goals of the
NLRA, the result is a very serious infringement on the liberty of those
parochial schools to pursue their mission of religious education.24
What should the Free Exercise Clause be read to say about
such accidental or inadvertent interferences with religious liberty?
Should the Free Exercise Clause be read to impose the same absolute
ban on inadvertent governmental interferences that it imposes on
deliberate governmental interferences? Should the government be
barred by the Free Exercise Clause from applying universal vaccination laws,25 compulsory education laws, 26 drug and alcohol abuse

laws, 27 tax laws, 28 etc., where the individual refusal to comply happens
to be religiously motivated? The "wall of separation" imagery would
seem to suggest that religiously motivated individual conduct is constitutionally exempt from the application of universal health and
welfare regulations and tax laws. Such a notion, however, would
quickly produce regulatory chaos in view of both the increasing religious diversity of our population and the increasingly pervasive and
detailed reach of general health and welfare regulations and tax laws.
Do we therefore conclude that, as long as the government has not set
out to regulate religion for religious reasons, a regulation raises no
free exercise clause problem? Is this the case no matter how serious
the inadvertent interference with an individual's religion and no
matter how insignificant the government's nonreligious regulatory
objective?

24. See, for example, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding
that church operated schools were not within the jurisdiction of the NLRB because of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment); Corporationof PresidingBishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327 (1987) (upholding religious institutions' statutory exemption from laws against religious
discrimination in employment); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir.
1990) (dealing with a church's objection to paying minimum wages because of the cost of
regulation).
25. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (concerning the constitutionality of
compulsory vaccination laws as applied to religious objectors).
26. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (concerning the constitutionality of
mandatory education laws as applied to the Old Order Amish).
27. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 (concerning the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting
the use of peyote as applied to Native Americans).
28. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (concerning the constitutionality of the
federal social security tax as applied to the Amish).
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Similar problems arise when a governmental benefit scheme
designed to promote a purely secular objective such as universal
education or universal health care accidentally or inadvertently aids
an individual or institution engaged in religiously motivated conduct.
Making municipal fire and police protection or sewer and water
services available to a church or parochial school is real economic
assistance to religion because the religious institution would
otherwise be forced to provide those services for itself at greatly
increased cost. Grants available to individuals under education or job
training programs will be spent by some recipients at seminaries or
other religious schools to pursue religious careers. 29 Certainly in
those instances the government grant program has significantly,
though unintentionally or inadvertently, aided religion.
In our modern welfare state characterized by governmentprovided health care, education, job training, transportation, and
minimum family incomes, inadvertent assistance to religious institutions or individuals engaged in religiously motivated conduct is inevitable.30 What should the Establishment Clause be read to say about
such inadvertent or accidental governmental aid of religion? In
fidelity to the "wall of separation" imagery, should we hold that all
governmental benefit schemes are unconstitutional whenever they
accidentally result in assisting religious institutions or religiously
motivated individuals?
The impracticality, not to mention the
undesirability, of such an approach must be obvious. Do we therefore
conclude that, as long as the government is pursuing some
nonreligious objective, aid to religion that results from a
governmental benefit scheme raises no establishment clause problem?
Is this true no matter how great and no matter how conspicuous the
aid to religion and no matter how much it creates the (unintended)
impression of close association between government and religion?
Simply stated, the problem that continues to vex the Court is
what to do about inadvertent or accidental impacts on religion when
they are challenged under the religion clauses. What should the Free
Exercise Clause be read to mean with respect to inadvertent governmental interferences with religion and what should the
Establishment Clause be read to mean with respect to instances of
29. See Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(allowing a student to use a vocational rehabilitation grant at a Christian college for seminar
training).
30. See, for example, Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool District, 113 S. Ct. 2462, 125 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1993) (allowing a student to use a state-provided sign-language interpreter in a
religious school).
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inadvertent governmental aid to or endorsement of religion? The task
confronting the Court, a task to which it seems perennially unequal,
is to develop a coherent jurisprudence to deal with the frequent
inadvertent collisions between governmental actions and the absolute
prohibitions of the First Amendment religion clauses.
All of the absolutely worded prohibitions of the First
Amendment present essentially the same systemic question: How
should the Court deal with an inadvertent or accidental governmental
interference with the protected right? For example, the Court is
regularly confronted with free speech clause challenges to governmental regulations intended to reduce noise or litter, to preserve
public safety, or to enhance environmental quality. These challenges
are brought by individuals whose chosen form of expression
(loudspeakers, leaflets, picketing, billboards, etc.) would violate the
regulation in question, even though the regulation was in no way intended to suppress the speaker's message and reflects no legislative
hostility to the message or legislative preference for a competing point
of view. Any deliberate attempt by the government to censor or impede political speech because of hostility to the message would be
found to be a per se violation of the Free Speech Clause. But what are
we to do with general health, welfare, and safety regulations that
inadvertently impede a particular individual's ability to disseminate
his or her political message?
A close examination of the Court's cases involving inadvertent
interference with speech reveals that the Court has made considerable progress in developing a workable jurisprudential approach to
inadvertence in the free speech context. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court appears unaware that this is precisely the same systemic jurisprudential question that is presented when similar regulations inadvertently affect the interests protected by the religion clauses. 31 The
31. One member of the Court, Justice Scalia, is well aware that inadvertent governmental
interference with the free exercise of religion presents precisely the same jurisprudential
problem that is presented by inadvertent governmental interference with free speech. Justice
Scalia persuaded a majority of the Court in Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, that inadvertent
interferences with religion should be held to raise no First Amendment problem and that the
line of cases beginning with Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398, should therefore be overruled. He then
argued in his concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring), that the Court should adopt the same hands-off approach to inadvertent
interferences with speech and that the line of cases typified by United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), should be overruled.
In contrast, the central thesis of this Article is that the existing free speech methodology
typified by O'Brien and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984),
should be incorporated into the Court's free exercise of religion jurisprudence, thus displacing
Justice Scalia's hands-off approach in Smith.
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Court persists in approaching cases of inadvertent interference with
speech through one set of doctrinal formulations, cases of inadvertent
interference with religion through an apparently unrelated set of
doctrinal formulae, and cases of inadvertent aid or endorsement of
religion through yet a third set of apparently independent doctrinal
constructs.
It is the central thesis of this Article that the conceptual methodology developed by the Court for dealing with inadvertence in the
free speech context is the only sensible approach to the inadvertence
problem in the context of any of the absolutely worded prohibitions of
the First Amendment. More specifically, this Article argues that the
Court's doctrinal approach to inadvertence in the free speech context
embodies the only workable conceptual methodology for the structurally identical problems of inadvertence in the free exercise context
and in the establishment clause context.
The second Part of this Article studies in some detail the
Court's unsatisfactory attempts to develop a workable jurisprudence
for religion clause challenges to governmental actions that accidentally or inadvertently affect religion. The third Part examines the
doctrinal methodology employed by the Court to deal with cases of
inadvertent interferences with speech. The fourth Part explores the
application of the Court's free speech methodology to the problems of
inadvertence in the free exercise clause context and in the
establishment clause context.
The Article concludes with the
argument that those current threads in religion clause jurisprudence
that appear to parallel the free speech methodology should be refined
and reinforced while those that diverge should be abandoned.
Surprisingly, this approach suggests among other things that the
Lemon test in establishment clause cases is not the complete "lemon"
that it is commonly thought to be!

II. "INADVERTENCE" IN RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The FreeExercise Clause
The Court's earliest attempts to cope with the problem that
this Article has characterized as inadvertent or accidental regulatory
interference with an individual's religion took the form of the now
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discredited belief-action distinction.32 According to this simple doctrinal construct, the state was absolutely prohibited by the Free
Exercise Clause from regulating individual religious beliefs, but the
clause placed no special restriction on the ability of the state to regulate religiously motivated conduct.
As a first cut at the problem, the belief-action distinction was
not as mindless as it now is commonly thought to have been. In fact,
it was a rough approximation of, or a workable surrogate for, the
distinction between deliberate legislative interference with religion
for religious reasons and accidental or inadvertent interferences with
religion in pursuit of some nonreligious legislative objective. Any
legislative measure designed to prohibit a particular religious belief
unaccompanied by any conduct would most certainly be motivated
only by the preference of the legislature for a competing religious
belief. Thus, all cases of regulation of belief would be regulation of
religion for religious reasons and would be per se violations of the
Free Exercise Clause. On the other hand, most state regulations of
conduct are for public welfare purposes having nothing to do with the
legislature's religious preferences. Any interference with religion that
results from the usual state regulation of conduct arises only when
particular individuals are engaging in the generally regulated conduct
because of their particular religious beliefs. Thus, interferences with
religion that result from generally applicable regulations of conduct
are usually inadvertent.
The primitive or rudimentary belief-action doctrinal construct
proved unsatisfactory in two respects. First, the correlation between
the belief-action distinction and the deliberate-inadvertent distinction
was far from perfect. It is apparent that the legislature could regulate religious conduct, such as worship services, for no reason other
than the legislature's religious preference in the choice of acceptable
conduct. Second, a regulation of religiously dictated conduct would be
upheld no matter how central the conduct was to the exercise of religion and no matter how insignificant was the government's nonreligious regulatory interest. Thus, the Court was forced to abandon the
simplistic belief-action distinction in favor of something approximating the distinction between deliberate state interference with religion
for religious reasons and inadvertent interference with religion in
pursuit of some nonreligious state objective. 33
32. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
33. See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594-95 (providing a replacement for the belief-action
distinction).
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The Court, however, carried forward to the new deliberateinadvertent distinction the second shortcoming of the old belief-action
distinction. According to the belief-action doctrine, once the Court
found the regulation to address action rather than belief, the Free
Exercise Clause presented no further problem.34 Not surprisingly,
when the Court substituted an intuitive form of the deliberate-inadvertent distinction for the cruder belief-action distinction, the Court
continued to hold that the Free Exercise Clause presented no problem
35
once the interference with religion was found to be inadvertent.
Thus, at this point in the development of free exercise clause jurisprudence, a deliberate state interference with religion for religious
An inadvertent state
reasons was per se unconstitutional.
interference with religion in pursuit of nonreligious state objectives
raised no free exercise clause problem, however, no matter how
serious the interference, no matter how trivial the state's nonreligious
objectives, and no matter how many alternative approaches were
available to the state to pursue its objectives with less impact on
religion.
Shortly after Justice Frankfurter announced this rule for the
Court in Gobitis,36 the Court seemed to recognize the extent to which
its approach subordinated the religious liberty of political minorities,
a specially protected constitutional value, to the common everyday
economic and public welfare objectives of the legislative majority.
37
Within three years, the Court in Board of Education v. Barnette
overruled the simple but constitutionally insensitive doctrine of
Gobitis and suggested instead that even inadvertent legislative
interferences with religion must pass some constitutional scrutiny
under the Free Exercise Clause.38 This suggestion ultimately grew to
full flower in the 1960s and '70s in cases like Sherbert 9 and Yoder.40
That line of cases held that a generally applicable regulatory measure
will violate the Free Exercise Clause, as applied to individuals whose
regulated conduct happens to be religiously motivated, unless the
state can show a compelling governmental interest to justify the
accidental interference with religion. In other words, in a relatively
34.

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.

35. According to Justice Frankfurter in Gobitis: 'The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen
from the discharge of political responsibilities." 310 U.S. at 594-95.

36.
37.

Id.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 642.
374 U.S. at 398.
406 U.S. at 205.
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short period of twenty-three years from Gobitis to Sherbert, the Court
moved from the doctrine that inadvertent interferences with religion
raise no free exercise problem to the doctrine that such interferences
violate the Free Exercise Clause in the absence of a compelling state
interest-the highest level of constitutional scrutiny short of a holding
of a per se violation.
The Sherbert compelling interest doctrine certainly solved the
major remaining problem with Gobitis and its predecessor, the beliefaction distinction. No longer could an individual's fundamental religious exercises be interfered with by an insensitive legislature in pursuit of some trivial nonreligious objective, or in the face of alternative
regulatory approaches that would not have produced such a serious
impact on religion. If a regulation impacted an individual's religion,
the regulation could only be constitutionally applied to that individual
if the Court found that the legislature was pursuing a compelling
nonreligious governmental objective and that the legislature had
chosen the least intrusive means possible to pursue that objective.
Unfortunately, the Sherbert doctrine invited any adherent of
any unusual religion to demand constitutional exemption from any
generally applicable public welfare regulation when the individual's
desire to engage in the regulated activity happened to be religiously
motivated. In short order, the Court was confronted with claims that:
a prohibition against racial discrimination violated the Free Exercise
Clause when applied to discriminatory policies of a religious college
that were religiously motivated;41 a government decision to build a
road in a government-owned wilderness area was precluded by the
Free Exercise Clause because practitioners of a certain Native
American religion considered the area sacred;42 and a requirement
that counsellors in a state-operated drug counseling program refrain
from personal use of hallucinogenic drugs violated the Free Exercise
Clause if the personal drug use by the counsellors was religiously
43
motivated.

41. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
42. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectionAssociation, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
43. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. Both Smith and Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398, actually
involved state unemployment compensation schemes that denied benefits to individuals who
were unemployed because they refused to qualify for available jobs. In each case, the claimant's
refusal to qualify for the job was based on religious reasons. The Court in both cases invoked a
form of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine to find that the withholding of unemployment
benefits acted as a "penalty" on each claimant's exercise of religious choice. The Court then
applied the free exercise analysis that would be applicable to any accidental regulatory
interference with religion.
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The problem with the Sherbert approach was that the Court
seemed to have substituted one extreme, the highest and strictest
form of constitutional review, for the earlier extreme of Gobitis, which
found no constitutional problem at all in cases of inadvertent state
interference with religion. Under Sherbert, if the compelling interest
test were taken seriously, generally applicable health and welfare
regulations would be held unconstitutional as applied. This would be
the case whenever such regulations impacted religion, no matter how
sound the state interest (short of compelling), no matter how
insignificant the impact on religion, no matter how peripheral the
impacted practice was to the particular religion, and regardless of
whether alternative practices were available to the individual that
would serve his or her religious purposes almost as well as the
regulated practice.
Naturally the Court was loath to dismantle its newly found
and entirely appropriate sensitivity to religious values inadvertently
trod upon by the state. But the Court was equally loath to paralyze
the regulatory machinery of the state by creating a dizzying array of
religious exceptions to otherwise generally applicable regulations.
The Court's initial response to this problem with Sherbert was to
continue applying something like the compelling interest test to each
case as a matter of theory or rhetoric, while effectively reducing the
level of scrutiny actually applied in cases where the impairment of
44
religion seemed less serious.

For other examples of unusual free exercise challenges to generally applicable regulations,
see Fromer v. Scully, 817 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1987) (involving a religious objection to a prison
directive that required Orthodox Jewish inmates to shave their beards to a length of one inch);
Menora v. Illinois High School Association, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982) (involving a conflict
between the Orthodox Jewish requirement of yarmulke and a state ban on headgear for
basketball players); Leahy v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (involving a
religious objection to a social security number requirement for driver's licenses).
44. In Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205, the Court conspicuously avoided using the words
"compelling interest" from Sherbert. Instead, the majority in Yoder employed language such as
"a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override," "only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served," Iunduly burdens the free exercise of religion," "somewhat less
substantial," and "incumbent on state to show with more particularity." Id. at 214, 220, 228,
236. In later cases, the Court found that "heightened scrutiny" was met by the government's
interest in tax revenue even though it is axiomatic that fmancial concerns never rise to the level
of a "compelling interest." Similarly, in Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 574, the Court
casually asserted that the government had shown a compelling interest in suppressing a private
religious college's policy prohibiting interracial dating.
Professor Berg has observed that: "Sherbertv. Verner can be read in a 'moderate' fashion,
as instituting case-by-case 'close scrutiny,'" instead of a true compelling interest test. Thomas
C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1994). Professor Berg observed that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts had begun to differentiate between types of burdens on religion, which could
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Later the Court expressly rejected the notion that "incidental
effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require
government to bring forward a compelling justification. 4s
Unfortunately, the Court did not go on to articulate clearly an
alternative standard or methodology for assessing the governmental
action that "incidentally" impaired the free exercise of religion. In its
most recent encounter with the problem, the Court seems to have
tossed out the entire Sherbert line of development and expressly
reinstated the simplistic approach of Gobitis. This startling development occurred in an opinion for the Court by Justice Scalia in Smith,
the "peyote case."46
In his opinion in Smith, Justice Scalia argued forcefully that it
would unacceptably impede the complex business of government if the
Court were to apply conscientiously the rigorous compelling interest
standard to every case in which a generally applicable state
regulation inadvertently interfered in some minor way with an individual's religion. 47 Of course, the Court had previously acknowledged
as much by watering down the compelling interest test in selected
cases where the Court was unimpressed with the seriousness of the
unintentional impact on religion. 48 But Justice Scalia rejected this
sort of ad hoc manipulation of the compelling interest test on the
grounds that it destroyed the force of that formidable constitutional
standard in those cases such as race discrimination where an
49
extremely high level of constitutional scrutiny was demanded.
At this point, Justice Scalia might have opted for the
articulation of some mid-level of scrutiny, some relativistic weighing
of the importance of the religion claim against the importance of the
state interest being served by the regulation. This too he rejected,
however, because he viewed assessing the importance of a particular
religious practice to be an impossible judicial task. 50 Thus, Justice
Scalia concluded that the Court had no option but to return to the
"reflect a justifiable effort to weigh the strength of the religious interest, . . . as part of the
overall process of 'balancing.' It seems sensible to require stronger reasons to justify a severe effect on religious freedom, and less to justify a minor effect." Id. at 51. Professor Berg ultimately
concluded, however, that courts are not competent to weigh effects on religion.
45. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450.
46. 494 U.S. at 872.
47. Id. at 888-89.
48. See cases cited in note 44.

49.

494 U.S. at 888.

50.

Id. at 886-87.
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Gobitis doctrine that inadvertent state interferences with religion
raise no free exercise clause problem no matter how serious the
inadvertent interference and no matter how trivial the state's
nonreligious regulatory objective.51
The Gobitis position to which the Court returned after fifty
years in Smith is highly unsatisfactory in several respects. First, the
religion clauses of the First Amendment were intended to protect
minority religions and minority religious practices from the tyranny of
the religious and political majority. 52 A deliberate regulatory
interference with minority religious freedom by the majority for
religious reasons is certainly the worst form of religious tyranny by
the majority. Regulatory interference with a minority religion as a
result of the ignorance or insensitivity of the religious and political
majority is, however, no less an interference with the minority's religious freedom. 53 One can be confident that if the regulation in question
had restricted the majority's religious practices, the majoritarian
legislative process would have modified or rejected the regulation.
Thus, the imposition of the political majority's nonreligious objectives
at the expense of the minority's religious interests implements the
majority's religious viewpoint at the expense of the minority's.
The second problem with the resurrected Gobitis approach is
that, in our political culture where direct deliberate regulatory imposition of religious orthodoxy is nearly unthinkable, state impairments
of minority religious practice will be of the inadvertent kind.54 To say
that the Free Exercise Clause provides no protection at all from such
impositions on religious freedom is to read the Free Exercise Clause
as essentially meaningless surplusage in the contemporary context.
The third and most damning problem with the Gobitis position
is that it simply defies educated common sense.- Even a reasonably
sophisticated person surveyed on the street probably would conclude
with little hesitation that the Free Exercise Clause should not be read
to allow the state to interfere with the most deeply held fundamental
51. Id. at 878-79.
52. "The [Free Exercise] Clause draws no distinction between laws whose object is to
prohibit religious exercise and laws with that effect, on its face seemingly applying to both."
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2248 (Souter, J., concurring).
53. "[L]aws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience
or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion." Smith, 494
U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. See also Thomas v. Review
Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (quoting Yoder).
54. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2243 (Souter, J., concurring).
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religious convictions of an individual in order to pursue some trivial
state economic or bureaucratic objective. 55 This is particularly true
where alternative approaches were available to the state that would
have been equally effective in pursuit of the state's objective without
the serious inadvertent impact on religion. 56
B. The Establishment Clause
The Supreme Court, at least until very recently, has approached cases of inadvertent governmental aid to, or endorsement of,
religion with what is commonly called the Lemon test. Although the
test is named after the case in which it was articulated, 57 the name
often is thought to suggest a comment on the quality of the jurisprudence involved. According to the Lemon test a court confronting an
establishment clause problem should ask three questions:
(1) Is it the purpose of the governmental action to aid or
promote religion?

55. ' There appears to be a strong argument... that the Clause was originally understood
to preserve a right to engage in activities necessary to fulfill one's duty to one's God, unless
those activities threatened... the serious needs of the State." Id. at 2249.
56. With the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), Publ. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.CA. § 2000bb (West 1994)), Congress explicitly disapproved of the
Smith holding that accidental interferences do not pose free exercise problems. The Act
declares that whenever governmental action "substantially burden[s]" the "exercise of religion,"
the government must prove that applying a law to a religious objector is the "least restrictive
means of furthering" a "compelling governmental interest." RFRA § 3(b). Thus, the RFRA
simply reimposes the "compelling interest" rhetoric which already has proved almost uselessly
plastic in Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Sherbertand Yoder. See note 44.
The RFRA's findings refer to the test "as set forth in prior Federal court rulings." RFRA §
2(a)(5). Furthermore, Congress stated that the purpose was "to restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." Id. at § 2(b)(1). The legislative history reveals that Congress believed that "the compelling interest test generally should
not be construed more stringently or leniently than it was prior to Smith." S. Rep. No. 103-11,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1993). Accord H. Rep. No. 103-88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993). See
generally Berg, 39 Vili. L. Rev. at 17-18, 26-28 (cited in note 44).
If Congress has imposed the "compelling interest" test actually implemented in the line of
cases from Sherbertand Yoder through the 1993 passage of the RFRA, and if that version of the
compelling interest test actually amounts to a Clark methodology as this Article argues, then in
fact one should understand the RFRA to impose that methodology. This interpretation seems
unavoidable because the Supreme Court will not read the RFRA to protect religiously motivated
conduct where it would not have been protected pre-Oregon v. Smith-i.e., the regulation
pursued some very important nonreligious objective, there were no adequate regulatory alternatives available to the government that would not entail as much inadvertent impact on
religion, and the inadvertent impact on religion was fairly minimal.
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

1352

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1335

(2) Even if it is not the purpose of the action, is aid to or
promotion of religion the primary effect of the governmental
action?
(3) Does the governmental action result in excessive
entanglement with religion?
If the answer to any of these three questions is affirmative, the
governmental action in question will be held to violate the
58
Establishment Clause.
Close inspection reveals that this apparently simple three-part
test actually combines two different kinds of questions and fails to
provide any real guidance on how to articulate, much less answer, the
critical question in a case of inadvertent establishment of religion.
The first of the three questions does not embody a methodology for
dealing with inadvertence cases at all. It poses the threshold inquiry
of whether the aid is in fact inadvertent or is deliberate and thus per
se unconstitutional as a classic violation of the Establishment Clause.
In effect, the first of the three Lemon questions does nothing more
than restate what we knew all along: if the government aid to religion is deliberate, it is per se unconstitutional; if it is not deliberate, we
have a tricky constitutional problem. Stated another way, the first of
the three Lemon questions simply requires that we distinguish between deliberate aid to religion cases (which are rare and per se
unconstitutional) and inadvertent or accidental aid cases. The first
question tells us nothing at all about what to do if we have an unintentional or inadvertent aid case. Thus, the methodology offered by
the Lemon test for inadvertence cases is contained entirely in the
second and third questions.
The second Lemon question requires that we ask whether the
unintended effect of aiding religion is the "primary" effect of the governmental action. Since by definition the first question has precluded
the possibility of an intended effect to aid religion, it is not immediately clear what the term "primary" effect means in the second question. The only plausible meaning in this context must be some notion
of the amount, importance, or obviousness of the aid. After the first
question has weeded out all intentional aid cases, the second question
must be understood to ask whether the unintended effect of aiding
religion is too great, too significant, or too conspicuous to be
constitutionally tolerable, even though it was not intended.

58.

Id. at 612-13.
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Although as an initial matter this is probably the right question to ask in an unintentional aid or endorsement case, the formulation is so general that it gives a court almost no guidance at all on
how to go about answering the critical question. How much inadvertent aid is too much? Too much compared to what? Should the Court
consider alternative approaches available to the state that would have
allowed the state to pursue its nonreligious objectives with less accidental endorsement of religion? Should the state be required to pursue an alternative approach that does not involve as much inadvertent endorsement of religion where the alternative approach does not
serve the state's nonreligious objective quite as well? How much
reduction in the effectiveness of the state's nonreligious program is
required in order to avoid how much inadvertent aid to religion?
While the second question of the three-part Lemon test may pose the
correct inquiry at the most general level, it hardly even hints at the
sophisticated judgments required to implement the Establishment
Clause in a case of inadvertent governmental aid to religion.
The third question of the three-part Lemon test is whether the
inadvertent aid (first question) which is not too much or too significant (second question) results in excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Its application in numerous dissimilar cases 59
suggests that the "entanglement" notion in the religion clause context
serves as some sort of comprehensive catch-all for various constitutionally suspect elements that do not fall neatly into the categories of
aid or regulation. As it appears in the third Lemon question, it seems
that the vague notion of entanglement refers to some sort of implicit
governmental endorsement of religion resulting from the appearance
of close association between government agencies or officers on the
one hand and the officers or agencies of religion on the other hand. In
effect, the Court's concern about "entanglement" in an establishment
60
clause context, as opposed to a regulatory or free exercise context,
must be some sort of concern about government appearing to legitimate or endorse religion by working too closely in a kind of conspicuous partnership with religion, even though under the second Lemon
question it was found that the inadvertent aid actually given religion
was not significant.
59. See, for example, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985) (noting that supervising
the content of publicly funded classes in religious schools "inevitably results in the excessive
entanglement of church and state).
60. For an example of the use of "entanglement" in a free exercise context, see Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 502 (declining to apply the NLRA to labor relations in a parochial
school context because such an application would present problems of entanglement).
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Thus, one usefully can view the third Lemon inquiry as simply
addressing a particular subcategory of aid to religion, i.e., apparent
endorsement. The third question, which directs the Court to determine whether the entanglement is excessive, can then be seen as
asking about this particular subcategory of inadvertent aid the same
question that is posed by the second inquiry regarding all other inadvertent aid, i.e., is it too much? In effect, the second and third Lemon
Is the inadvertent
questions collapse into a single inquiry:
governmental aid, whether real (second Lemon question) or apparent
(third Lemon question), too much to tolerate under the Establishment
Clause? The separate articulation of the third Lemon question, which
turns out to be simply a particularized application of the second question, adds nothing to guide the Court in making the complex value
judgments that are required by the second Lemon question.
Although there have been some recent rumblings of dissatisfaction with the Lemon test from individual justices,6 1 the Court has
failed to develop the Lemon test beyond a three-part construct that
sounds misleadingly specific bi't in fact reduces to a single extremely
general question of degree. This specific-sounding, but in fact extremely general, instruction to the Court to make an ad hoc value
judgment about how much inadvertent aid to religion is too much in
61. Justice Scalia recommended abandoning the Lemon test because it has made "such a
maze of the Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can
only guess what motives will be held constitutional." Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, the Lemon test exacerbates the tension between the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, has no basis in the language or history of the First
Amendment, and is too flexible and unprincipled a standard to be tolerated. Id. at 640. He
wrote that the "flexibility" of the Lemon test should be sacrificed for "clarity and predictability"
in the Establishment Clause area. Id.
In his concurrence in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 113 S.
Ct. 2141, 2149-50, 124 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1993), Justice Scalia derided the Lemon test still more
graphically. "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center
Moriches Union Free School District." Id. Also concurring in Lamb's Chapel, Justice Kennedy
referred to the majority's citation of Lemon as "unsettling and unnecessary." Id. at 2149
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist rejects the Lemon methodology because of the confusion in its applications and because of his interpretation of the Framers' intent. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110-11
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to Justice Rehnquist, the Framers intended the
Establishment Clause merely "to prohibit the designation of any church as a 'national one' " and
"to stop the [government) from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect
over others." Id. at 113.
Attacking the Lemon test from the opposite flank, Justice Stevens has stated that "[rjather
than continuing with the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier' described in Lemon v. Kurtzman, I would resurrect the 'high and impregnable'
wall between church and state constructed by the Framers of the First Amendment."
Committee for Public Educationv. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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each case has produced, not surprisingly, wildly varying results over
time. For example, the Court has held that the state may lend books
to parochial school students, 62 but in another case held unconstitutional the lending of maps, magazines, transparencies and other similar instructional materials.63 Likewise, the Court has held unconstitutional a system of tuition reimbursements and tax deductions for
parents of parochial school students,6 yet in a later case upheld a
similar system of tax deductions.65
The Lemon test in effect (though not in its articulation) asks
the right question: How much inadvertent governmental aid to or
endorsement of religion is too much? But the formulation of the issue
is so imprecise, so primitive and confusing, that no guidance is provided on what the Court should look at and what sort of yardstick it
should use to measure the elements that are considered relevant. The
question as formulated does not even tell us whether the Court should
consider the availability of alternative governmental approaches to
the program, where those alternatives would entail less inadvertent
aid to religion. The Court in Lemon remains a long way from a
coherent jurisprudence for cases of inadvertent governmental aid to or
endorsement of religion. This Article concludes that the appropriate
response to the current dissatisfaction with Lemon is the further
development and refinement of the Lemon approach rather than the
complete rejection of the Lemon methodology.

III. "INADVERTENCE" IN THE FREE SPEECH CoNTEXr-THE CLARK
METHODOLOGY
The Supreme Court continues to struggle with the vagueness
of the Lemon test in establishment clause cases and with the all-ornothing dilemma of the Sherbert approach versus the Gobitis-Smith
approach in free exercise clause cases. Meanwhile, however, the
Court has developed a much more coherent and sophisticated
doctrinal framework to address the problem of inadvertent
interference with free speech.
The Supreme Court's earliest encounters with the problem of
inadvertent regulation of speech came in the form of so-called "time,

62. Allen, 392 U.S. at 236.
63. Walter, 433 U.S. at 229.
64.
65.

Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388.
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place, or manner" restrictions on traditional forms of speech. 66 Classic
examples are regulations restricting the sound volume or the hours of
use of truck-mounted loud speakers,7 regulations restricting the size
or placement of signs or billboards,68 and regulations prohibiting the
obstruction of pedestrian or vehicular traffic by picketers or speechmakers.69 These general health, welfare, and safety regulations were
explicitly directed at activities commonly perceived as communication,
i.e., "speech." Nonetheless, the Court understood that in many cases
the regulatory objective (e.g., reduced noise, clutter, or congestion)
was entirely legitimate from a First Amendment perspective. The
legislature was not seeking to make communication more difficult or
to promote or retard any particular viewpoint in the marketplace of
ideas.
Inadvertent regulation of speech presented a serious dilemma.
On the one hand, such general health, welfare, and safety regulations
are not on their face the sort of censorship of ideas or messages that
the First Amendment seems designed to preclude. The traditional
police powers of government could be rendered largely impotent if
every violator of a general rule could claim exemption from regulation
on the grounds that his prohibited conduct was in some way communicative, or was (in the language of today) intended to "make a statement!" On the other hand, however, effective censorship of the message can be achieved by invoking apparently neutral health, welfare,
and safety regulations that prohibit the use of the only medium available to the speaker. Even if no deliberate attempt to suppress the
message by restricting the medium is apparent, the health, welfare,
and safety objective of the state might be so trivial or so poorly served
by the regulation that the serious (though inadvertent) restriction on
speech is unwarranted.
In response to this difficult analytical and constitutional policy
problem, the Court developed a sophisticated and discriminating body
of free speech jurisprudence. Legitimate "time, place, or manner"
restrictions on traditional forms of speech were, according to the
Court, distinguishable from those regulations that expressly or cov66. See, for example, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (concerning the
constitutionality of a New Jersey law prohibiting sound trucks); Schneiderv. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (concerning the constitutionality of municipal laws prohibiting distribution of leaflets).
67. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 78-79.
68. Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
69. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (upholding a statute that prohibited unlicensed
parades or processions upon public streets so that public authorities could prepare to police the
event, avoid overlapping events, and secure use of the streets for others).
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ertly censored or impeded speech because of official disapproval of the
message. 70 Time, place, or manner restrictions will be sustained in
the face of a First Amendment challenge if (1) they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated expression, (2) they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3)
they leave open adequate alternative channels for communication of
71
the information or viewpoint.
After it had come to grips with the problem of "time, place, or
manner restrictions" on traditional forms of speech, the Court began
to confront First Amendment challenges to regulations that prohibited forms of conduct not readily recognized as speech, such as
vandalism or trespass. In these "symbolic speech" cases, the claimant
contended that he or she had chosen to engage in the prohibited
activity in order to dramatize or publicize a particular political viewpoint. As a result, the application of the general health, welfare, or
safety regulation to the conduct of this particular actor could be seen
as a significant restriction on communicative activity, i.e., "speech."
Typical cases involved prohibitions against draft card destruction,72
burglary or vandalism laws applied to draft board office destruction, 73
and trespass laws applied to all sorts of disruptive "sit-ins" or
"occupations" in university office buildings and other places. 74
These "symbolic speech" cases presented exactly the same
problem that the Court had already addressed in the "time, place, or
manner cases." Both involved general regulatory restrictions enacted
in pursuit of some health, welfare, or safety objective completely
unrelated to any communicative import that any particular instance
of the regulated activity may or may not have in any particular case.
In other words, the action or conduct itself presented the social evil
being regulated, whether the action (e.g., noise, destruction of property, or blocking traffic) was communicating something or not. The
only factor that distinguishes time, place, or manner cases from symbolic speech cases is the obviousness of the unintended impact on
expression. In the former case, the legislature would have known
that in pursuit of its nonspeech health, welfare, and safety objective it
would be interfering with speech, by regulating conduct that was

70. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981).
71. Id.
72. See, for example, O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367.
73. See, for example, United States v. Berrigan,482 F.2d 171 (3rd. Cir. 1973).
74. See, for example, Consejo General de Estudiantes de La Universidadde Puerto Rico v.
University ofPuerto Rico, 325 F. Supp. 453 (D. P.R. 1971).
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commonly chosen as a means of communication. In the symbolic
speech cases, however, the regulated conduct was not commonly recognized as a means of communication, and thus the legislature in
pursuit of its nonspeech regulatory objective would not have been
aware of the unintended impact on speech in the particular circumstances of the case at issue. Unfortunately, the Court initially seemed
unaware that its approach to the earlier time, place, or manner cases
was readily applicable to these new "symbolic speech" cases. As a
result, the Court began to develop and articulate a parallel methodology for these new cases.
The most complete early articulation of the developing methodology for "symbolic speech" cases is the draft card burning case,
United States v. O'Brien.75 According to the Court in O'Brien, a
general conduct regulation that is applied to conduct intended by the
particular actor to communicate his or her viewpoint will survive
First Amendment challenge if (1) it is within the constitutional power
of government, (2) it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest. 76 Close inspection of the O'Brien
criteria leads to the conclusion ultimately reached by the Court in
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence:77 the four-part
O'Brien standard for symbolic speech cases is "little, if any, different"
from the standard established by the Court in the long line of time,
7
place, or manner cases. 8
The first O'Brien criterion underlies any constitutional inquiry;
it is not a logical step in "symbolic speech" analysis any more than in
time, place, or manner analysis, or any other First Amendment
analysis. In other words, for purposes of comparing the O'Brien criteria to any other First Amendment analysis, the first O'Brien criterion
75. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
76. Id. at 377.
77. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
78. Id. at 298. Since the two lines of cases present what is analytically the same problem,
it should come as no surprise that the two apparently independent and parallel lines of doctrinal
development ultimately converged in Clark. What should be surprising is the extent to which
the Court failed for many years to recognize that the two lines of cases were in all material
aspects identical. This tendency to develop a separate methodology for each "category" of cases
while ignoring the identity of the underlying problem is pervasive. That in effect is the subject
of this entire Article. It is the stated thesis of this Article that the problem of inadvertent
interference in the free exercise context and in the establishment context is analytically
identical to the problem of inadvertent interference with speech and that the same methodology
is applicable to deal with the problem of inadvertence in all First Amendment manifestations.
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can be ignored as simply stating a universal prerequisite. The third
O'Brien criterion is identical in operation to the first and most critical
of the time, place, or manner requirements: the regulatory interest at
stake must be something other than the suppression of communication. In other words, the impact on expression must be incidental to
the pursuit of a nonspeech regulatory objective. In a word, the impact
on speech must be inadvertent. The second O'Brien criterion is identical to one of the two elements contained in the second time, place, or
manner criterion: the nonspeech regulatory objective must be
"significant," "substantial," or "important." A trivial regulatory objective that would sustain a regulation against a general substantive due
process challenge will not be sufficient where the regulation inadvertently impairs First Amendment speech. The fourth O'Brien criterion
tracks closely the second element in the second time, place, or manner
criterion: the regulation must be narrowly tailored so that it has no
greater inadvertent impact on speech than is necessary to effectuate
the regulation's nonspeech regulatory objective. According to Clark,
the stricter-sounding O'Brien formulation of this criterion should not
be understood to impose a higher standard than that required by the
time, place, or manner analysis. 79
The only apparent difference between the O'Brien criteria and
the classic time, place, or manner formulation is that time, place, or
manner analysis expressly requires a conscious evaluation of the
alternative forms of communication that remain available after application of the challenged regulation. Thus, the Court concluded in
Clark that the O'Brien analysis was subsumed in the more broadly
applicable time, place, or manner formulation. In Clark, the Court
authoritatively summarized the methodology applicable to all cases of
inadvertent interferences with expression that occur in the course of
pursuing a regulatory objective other than suppression of expression.
Such regulations will be upheld if (1) the regulatory objective is unrelated to the content of the regulated expression, (2) the regulation is
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3)
the regulation leaves open adequate alternative channels for communication of the message.8 0
The first of these three criteria embodies the threshold question: Is this regulation a deliberate interference by the legislature in
the marketplace of ideas, reflecting a legislative preference for certain
viewpoints, or is this truly an inadvertent interference, an unintended
79.
80.

Id. at 298.
Id. at 293.
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by-product resulting from the legislature's pursuit of some nonspeech
health, welfare, or safety objective? If all speakers and all viewpoints
are subjected to the same regulatory restriction (e.g., limits on noise
level) no inference of governmental hostility to a particular message
or preference for a competing message arises. If, however, speakers
with certain viewpoints are subjected to the regulatory restriction
while speakers with other viewpoints are exempted, one can infer that
the regulation is intended to impede the dissemination of certain
viewpoints. At the very least, one would infer that the legislature
considered its health, welfare, or safety objective to be worth pursuing
only at the expense of disfavored viewpoints while not worth pursuing
at the expense of more preferred viewpoints. In other words, where a
health, welfare, or safety regulation is not content neutral,s1 the
inference of some deliberate regulatory interference with the free
competition of ideas is unavoidable. Thus, this first criterion has
come to be known in shorthand as a requirement that the regulation
in question be "content neutral." If the regulation is not content
neutral, i.e., if it is "content based," it will be invalidated by the same
reasoning that is applied to any deliberate legislative attempt to
82
censor disfavored messages.
If the first criterion simply serves to distinguish truly inadvertent interferences from deliberate interferences, the second and third
criteria must contain the Court's entire methodology for dealing with
inadvertent interferences. At first glance, the second and third criteria appear to state two simple and independent requirements. On
somewhat closer inspection, however, the second criterion is seen to
contain two separate requirements: the regulation must serve a substantial or important governmental interest (as opposed to the usually
adequate "reasonable" objective) and the regulation must be narrowly
tailored to serve that objective, without inadvertent restrictions on
81. "[Ihe First Amendments hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a
restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public discussion of an entire
topic." Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992).
82. Like other criteria or "tests," this inquiry can be manipulated to allow the Court to
classify as inadvertent what actually is a legislative attempt to restrict disfavored communications. As the dissent in Barnespointed out, close inspection of the anti-nudity ordinance in that
case suggests that it actually was aimed at certain forms of expressive nudity. 501 U.S. at 592
(White, J., dissenting). Even the general prohibition against draft card destruction upheld in
O'Brien probably was an attempt by Congress to suppress a particularly effective form of antiwar protest. Protecting the orderly functioning of the draft system was the asserted purpose
uncritically accepted by the Court. That purpose, however, seemed to have been adequately
served by the longstanding legal requirement that eligible individuals be in possession of their
draft cards. Congress's passage of the new anti-destruction law at the time of widespread antiwar protests by draft card burning is hard to dismiss as pure coincidence.
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speech that are not necessary for the accomplishment of the regulatory objective. Thus, the second and third Clark criteria articulate
three operative requirements.
First, Clark requires a subjective assessment of the importance
of the government's nonspeech regulatory objective. Second, Clark
requires an assessment of the importance of this particular regulatory
means for pursuing the objective when other means might adequately
serve the same objective without the same level of inadvertent interference with speech. These first two Clark requirements are simply
the two parts of a complete assessment of the government's nonspeech
interest in regulating any particular activity.
Third, Clark requires an assessment of the speaker's ability to
use alternative means of communication for his or her message. To
the extent that alternative means of expression are available to the
speaker, the speech interest in the regulated activity is reduced.
Thus, an investigation of the adequacy of alterative means of communication is one part of a complete assessment of the significance of the
interference with speech that inadvertently results, from regulating a
particular communicative activity. The second part of such an assessment, the importance of the speech itself, is simply assumed
without explicit statement in cases like Clark that involve political
messages that are the type of speech at the core of First Amendment
protection.
In cases of activity conveying messages that are of "lower First
Amendment value" than political speech, 83 it is clear that an assessment of the value of the speech itself is the second part of the Court's
evaluation of the extent of the inadvertent interference with speech.
Where the Court characterizes the expression involved in the regulated activity as "peripheral" First Amendment free speech,
inadvertent interferences with that expression will be more readily
found acceptable.84 Thus, the third explicit Clark requirement and
the fourth implicit requirement together compose a complete
assessment of the individual's speech interest in any particular
regulated activity.
Close inspection also reveals that all of the operative terms or
concepts in these four requirements are relative, requiring some sort
83. See, for example, Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (giving less value to nude dancing as a form
of speech).
84. The majority in Barnes devalued the speech in order to reduce the level of inadvertent
interference: "Nlude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct
within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so."
Id.
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of judgment of degree or "balancing". First, the nonspeech regulatory
interest must be "important" or "substantial". How "important" must
the government's regulatory interest be?
How much more
"substantial" than the usually adequate "reasonable" legislative objective is required, yet still short of "compelling"? Second, the regulation
must be "narrowly tailored" to accomplish the legislative objective,
without undue inadvertent interference with speech. Since the Court
has made it clear that "narrowly tailored" does not mean 'least restrictive alterative,"85 we must wonder just how "narrow," short of
"narrowest," the regulation must be to meet this requirement.
Third, the regulation must leave open "adequate" alternative
channels of communication. The adequacy of any alternative means
of communication would be assessed by the speaker on the basis of a
complex calculus involving many factors: size of audience, dramatic
impact, potential for additional publicity through news media coverage, cost, and the speaker's financial resources, etc. One confidently
can assert that no alternative is adequate in one sense: the speaker
can be assumed to have chosen the "best" means of communicating his
or her viewpoint after considering the range of factors involved in all
of the available alternatives. Thus it is clear that "adequate" means
something less than "best," or even "equally good" from the speaker's
point of view.86 Fourth, it must be ascertained whether the expression
contained in the regulated activity is the sort that is "central" to the
First Amendment or is "at the periphery" of First Amendment
concerns or (by implication) ranks somewhere in between, in terms of
87
its contribution to the marketplace of ideas.
85. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
86. The Supreme Court appears to have overlooked this step of the Clark analysis in
invalidating the municipal ordinance in Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 490. San Diego had
prohibited all large billboards on private property but had exempted those erected on the site of
a business to identify the on-site business. The Court held the ordinance invalid because the
signs prohibited were distinguishable from the permitted signs only by their content. San Diego
appears, however, to have concluded that effective alternatives were available to off-site
billboard advertisers, while no equally effective alternative was available to those seeking to
identify the location of their on-site business. Thus, application of the ban to on-site businesses
would have been a much larger inadvertent interference with their commercial speech than that
experienced by users of off-site billboards. The aesthetic purpose of the regulation justified the
lesser inadvertent interference with the speech of those who had ready alternatives but did not
justify the greater interference with the speech of those who had no effective alternative. It
seems that the city of San Diego may have used a more sophisticated Clark analysis in drafting
the ordinance than the Supreme Court used in invalidating it.
87. This is the step in the Clark analysis that the Supreme Court seems to have
overlooked in invalidating the municipal ordinance in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 123 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1993). Cincinnati had prohibited the use of sidewalk
newspaper racks by the distributors of free advertising pamphlets or catalogs such as the
ubiquitous catalog of local real estate listings. Use of identical sidewalk sales racks by
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This demonstration of the relativistic nature of the Court's
articulated criteria is not intended as a cheap Socratic trick or the
sort of nihilistic exercise in deconstruction that characterizes Critical
Legal Theory methodology. 88 Rather, it is intended to demonstrate
that the Court's description of its methodology, while useful, simply is
not complete. Determinations such as "important," "substantial,"
"narrow," "adequate," "central," or "peripheral" must be made with
reference to something. A study of the many cases where the Court
has applied this methodology suggests that in any given case the
factors are assessed with reference to each other. In other words, the
factors are balanced against each other. Stated more fully and more
precisely, the Clark methodology appears to require that the Court
weigh the importance of the government's nonspeech regulatory interest, in light of alternative regulatory schemes available to the
government, against the scope of the interference with the actor's
speech, in light of the alternative means of communication available
to him or her. Where the government's nonspeech regulatory interest
is insignificant or where an alternative regulatory scheme would
accomplish the objective with minimal impact on speech, a significant
inadvertent regulatory impact on speech will not be justified.
Conversely, where the speaker's communication is of minimal First
Amendment value or where effective alternative means of communication remain available, the inadvertent regulatory impact on speech
will be considered acceptable.
If this is not the Court's intuitive understanding of its Clark
methodology, it ought to be. Indeed, this is the only sensible way to
construct a middle course between the Scylla of no First Amendment
protection against inadvertent interference and the Charybdis of the
paralyzing "compelling interest" test applied to every generally applicable health, welfare, and safety regulation that happens to interfere
with some particular individual's off-beat way of expressing herself.
No single rule or "objective" standard can be articulated (or even
traditional newspapers was not prohibited by the ordinance. The Court held the ordinance
invalid because the prohibition applied only to certain publications identified by their content
and not other publications distinguished only by their content. In contrast, Cincinnati in
drafting the ordinance seems to have concluded that its aesthetic interests justified the
inadvertent interference with the low value commercial speech in the advertiser's newsracks
but did not justify the same level of inadvertent interference with the most highly valued speech
of traditional newspapers. As in Metromedia,Inc., the drafters of the Cincinnati ordinance may
have employed a more sophisticated Clark analysis than the Supreme Court used in
invalidating the ordinance.
88. See, for example, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement,
96 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 564-65 (1983).
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imagined) to dispose appropriately of the infinite variations in
governmental regulatory interests and speaker interests possible in
inadvertent interference cases.
The Clark methodology was developed in the free speech area
to structure, direct, and confine the courts in the process of answering
the central question of degree: "Is this inadvertent effect too much?"
The Clark methodology does not (and could not) eliminate the subjective nature of the ultimate value judgment that must be made in order to answer such a question of degree. But the Clark methodology
identifies the factors to be weighed in each case (the government's
nonspeech regulatory interest and the individual's interest in the
communicative aspect of the activity regulated). Clark then provides
a partial measure for assessing the import of each factor in the specific case (investigating and evaluating alternatives available to the
government and to the affected individual under the circumstances).
Finally, Clark directs that the factors, once assessed in that case, be
weighed or measured against each other (a balancing of the extent of
the government's nonspeech regulatory interests in that case against
the extent of the inadvertent restriction on the speech interests of the
individual in that case).
IV. APPLYING THE CLARK METHODOLOGY TO RELIGION CLAUSE CASES

A. The FreeExercise Clause
In the line of inadvertent free exercise cases from Gobitis89 to
the Court's last word in Smith,90 the Court has continued to struggle
with a choice between two doctrinal extremes. On one hand is the
Sherbert-Yoder approach which, at least as a rhetorical matter,
applies the highest and most demanding standard of constitutional
review. Taken seriously, this approach will render invalid most general health, welfare, and safety regulations when they are applied to
activity that coincidentally happens to be motivated by some sincere
religious belief, no matter how obscure or unusual the belief and no
matter how unimportant the activity may be in the overall scheme of
the religious beliefs in question. On the other hand is the GobitisSmith doctrine, under which a general health, welfare, or safety regu-

89.
90.

310 U.S. at 586.
494 U.S. at 872.
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lation that inadvertently interferes with a particular individual's
religion raises no free exercise clause problem at all as long as the
government's regulatory objective is strictly nonreligious. Under this
approach, a regulation enacted in pursuit of a nonreligious objective
will be sustained without any First Amendment review at all, no
matter how serious the inadvertent interference with religion and no
matter how trivial the government's nonreligious regulatory objective.
This ongoing doctrinal dilemma is solved by the recognition
that the problem of inadvertent regulatory interference with the free
exercise of religion is conceptually or structurally identical to the
problem of inadvertent regulatory interference with free speech.9 1
Thus, the Clark methodology for dealing with the free speech version
of the inadvertent regulation problem is directly transferable to the
free exercise of religion version of the inadvertence problem.92
Following Clark in a free exercise case, the Court should first
ask (as it already must under both Sherbert-Yoder and Gobitis-Smith)

91. For an early example of the insight that the problems presented by the Free Exercise
Clause are analytically identical to those presented by the Free Speech Clause, see Robert D.
Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 Const. Comm. 147 (1987).
Professor Kamenshine argued that the Court should abandon the charade of strict scrutiny in
the Sherbert line of free exercise cases and should explicitly adopt the balancing methodology
utilized for the free speech claim in O'Brien. Id. at 147-54
See also G. Michael McCrossin, Note, General Laws, Neutral Principles, and the Free
Exercise Clause, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 149 (1980). McCrossin criticized the Court for appearing to
give religion a higher level of protection than it gives free speech in cases of inadvertent interference by general laws. Id. at 174. McCrossin suggested a detailed balancing approach for
cases of inadvertent interference with free exercise. Id.
A third commentator argued that the Court should apply the same methodology to free
exercise and free speech cases because the two clauses protect similar interests. William P.
Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: FreeExercise as Expression, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 545
(1983). Professor Marshall observed that the Court has sometimes treated religion claims and
speech claims as interchangeable, converting an individual's religious objections into a free
speech claim. Professor Marshall concluded, as did McCrossin, that free exercise claims should
not receive a higher level of protection from general laws than that applied to free speech
claims. The tendency to convert free exercise claims into free speech claims may accelerate
after the Smith holding that inadvertent regulatory interferences with religion raise no First
Amendment problem. The same interference with the same activity characterized as speech
rather than religion would be subjected to a Clark analysis. See, for example, Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 417, 130 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1995), where the
claimant abandoned his free exercise claim in the District Court but carried essentially the
same claim characterized as free speech to the U.S. Supreme Court.
92. Professor Seeburger criticized the Court's purported use of the compelling interest test
in free exercise cases: "The test recognizes no distinctions in the degrees, directness, or types of
burdens and is insensitive to differences in governmental policy." Richard H. Seeburger, Public
Policy Against Religion: Doubting Thomas, 11 Pepp. L. Rev. 311, 320 (1984). Professor
Seeburger suggested the substitution of a fact-oriented balancing test that considers all relevant
factors such as the strength of the governmental interest, the existence of less burdensome
alternatives, the degree of burden on the claimant's religious interest, and the importance of the
individual religious interest. Id. at 312, 328-29.
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whether the regulatory impact on religion was the result of an attempt by the majority to impose its religious preferences on nonconformist minority religions. Alternatively, was the impact on particular minority religious practices simply an inadvertent effect of a regulation adopted in pursuit of general nonreligious health, welfare, or
safety objectives? If the impact on religion is a deliberate attempt to
impose the religious objectives of the legislative majority, the regulation is a per se violation of the Free Exercise Clause. If, however, the
impact on religion was an unintended effect of a general regulation
pursuing nonreligious objectives, the Court must decide whether the
unintended effect on religion is too great to be permitted under the
Free Exercise Clause.
Although not recognized as the first step in a Clark analysis,
this first question and its analytical consequences seem firmly established in current free exercise jurisprudence. In its 1993 decision in
Church of the Lukume Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,93 the Court held
unconstitutional four city ordinances that prohibited the sacrifice of
animals as part of a religious ritual. The Court noted that the ordinances only outlawed the killing of animals for religious purposes.
The ordinances permitted killing animals for almost any other reason,
including pest control, commercial slaughter, and sport.9 4 City officials had enacted the ordinances only after community residents
complained about an individual's announced plans to establish a
Santerian church in the largely Hispanic suburb.9 5 During the discussion of the proposed ordinances, city council members repeatedly
criticized Santeria and branded it undesirable.96 The Court found
that the selective scope of the prohibition in the ordinances, combined
with the legislative history and the circumstances surrounding their
enactment, established that the ordinances were specifically designed
to suppress the Santerian church. 97
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that
"[t]hose in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands
and must ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of
93. 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993).
94. Id. at 2228-29.
95. Id. at 2223.
The Santerian church is an African-Cuban religious group that
occasionally utilizes ritual sacrifice of animals, usually chickens, sheep or goats. Id. at 2222.
96. Id. at 2231. At one meeting, the council president asked: "What can we do to prevent
the church from opening?" Id. at 2231. A second council member charged that the Bible allows
animal slaughter only for food consumption. Id. A police department chaplain asserted that

Santeria is "an abomination to the Lord" and urged the council "not to permit the church to
exist." Id.
97. Id.
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law and regulation are secular.'8 To Justice Kennedy it was clear
that "]egislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised,
designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. The laws
here in question were enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are void."9 9 In other words, the Hialeah ordinances
failed the first standard in a Clark analysis. Because the interference
with religion was the deliberate objective of the ordinances, not an
inadvertent by-product of a regulatory measure designed to accomplish nonreligious objectives, the ordinances were per se violations of
the Free Exercise Clause. 1

98. Id. at 2234.
99. Id.
100. The various opinions in Hialeah may have muddied the water surrounding even this
simple and straightforward proposition. The decision in Hialeah was unanimous and each of
the several opinions ultimately seehis to be based on some form of per se unconstitutionality
because the regulatory interference with religion was deliberate. However, the rhetorical
constructs employed in several of the opinions add considerable confusion to what should have
been a very simple case.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court concludes rather quickly and confidently that the
ordinances in question were "an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious
practices" and that "[t]he ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion." Id. at
2228, 2231. Nonetheless, the opinion then purports to apply "the most rigorous of scrutiny" to
ascertain whether the ordinances "'advance interests of the highest order' and [are] narrowly
tailored in pursuit of those interests." Id. at 2233. The opinion cites Yoder, a classic case of
inadvertent regulatory impact, as authority for this standard of review which Kennedy (but not
Yoder) characterizes as "[t~he compelling interest standard." Id. In the end, Justice Kennedy
finds that the ordinances fail this standard of review precisely because they are not rules of
general applicability but are aimed only at religion. Id. at 2233-34.
Justice Souter's opinion states at the outset that "[tihis case turns on a principle about
which there is no disagreement, that the Free Exercise Clause bars government action aimed at
suppressing religious belief or practice. The Court holds that Hialeah's animal-sacrifice laws
violate that principle, and I concur .... " Id. at 2240. Nonetheless, Justice Souter's concurrence
moves on to criticize what he calls dicta in the Court's opinion concerning the Smith methodology for dealing with inadvertent regulatory interferences with religion. In the course of that
discussion, Justice Souter observed: "[W]e have applied the same rigorous scrutiny to burdens
on religious exercise resulting from the enforcement of formally neutral, generally applicable
laws as we have applied to burdens caused by laws that single out religious exercise ... " Id. at
2243. In his attempt to raise the level of scrutiny imposed in cases of inadvertent interference
after Smith, Justice Souter seems to have suggested that the approach to cases of deliberate
interference should be some form of strict scrutiny rather than the finding of per se unconstitutionality with which his opinion began.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, states that "(wihen the State
enacts legislation that intentionally or unintentionally places a burden upon religiously motivated practice, it must justify that burden by 'showing that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest.'" Id. at 2250. For this proposition, Justice Blackmun
cites Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), a classic case of inadvertent interference
virtually identical to Sherbert in facts and result. Justice Blackmun then concludes, however,
that a "regulation that targets religion in this way, ipso facto, fails strict scrutiny." Id. at 2251.
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The conspicuous absence of any such finding or any similar
language in the line of decisions from Sherbert through Smith01 suggests that the Court was at least intuitively aware that any governmentally imposed impediment to religious practice in those cases was
an unintended consequence of the government's pursuit of some
clearly nonreligious objective.102
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetary Protection Association,1°3 Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion characterized such inadvertent impacts on religion as
"indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion '104 and as
"incidental effects of government programs,"105 which she contrasts

with "outright prohibitions"106 on free exercise.

Justice Scalia's

101. This much discussed line of cases includes Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398 (involving the
denial of unemployment benefits to a plaintiff who refused, pursuant to her religious beliefs, to
work on Saturday); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (involving the application of a compulsory education
law to the Amish contrary to their religious belief); Lee, 455 U.S. at 252 (involving the
application of a Social Security tax to an Amish employer in spite of his religious objection to the
Social Security system); Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 574 (involving the denial of a tax
exemption to a religious college because of its religiously based ban on interracial dating); Lyng,
485 U.S. at 439 (involving the construction of a U.S. Forest Service road through a sacred
Native American site on federal government property); Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 (involving the
denial of unemployment benefits to a former state employee who lost his job because of peyote
use in conformity with his religion).
102. The Court's finding that the unavailability of benefits acted as a penalty on the exercise of religious choice in both Sherbert and Smith is open to serious question. If the claimants
had chosen to ignore the dictates of their religion, they would have been employed and thus still
would not have been eligible for benefits. In other words, the benefit scheme in each case
presented no motivation or reward for foregoing the exercise of religion because the claimants
would not have been able to collect benefits either way. In each case, the government simply
refused to subsidize the individual's choice not to work whether that choice was motivated by a
desire to conform to religion or a desire to go fishing.
The Sherbert holding and the similar result in Thomas forced the state to subsidize an
individual's choice of religion over competing unsubsidized options such as fishing or watching
television. This point was emphasized by Justice Stewart concurring in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
414-15 (Stewart,. J., concurring), and by Justices Harlan and White dissenting, id. at 422
(Harlan, J., and White, J., dissenting). Thus, the Court's result in Sherbert and Thomas is itself
a rather obvious violation of the Establishment Clause, while the invalidated state benefit
schemes actually raised no free exercise problem. (An exception in Sherbert for those who
refused to work on Saturday probably was a violation of the Establishment Clause, but the
Court's analysis overlooked this aspect of the case).
In contrast, the Court avoided this serious mistake in the structurally identical free speech
case of Lyng v. United Auto Workers, 485 U.S. 360 (1988). In that case, the Court confronted a
claim by a striking worker that the denial of extra foodstamp benefits to replace income lost by
striking constituted a Sherbert penalty on his freedom of speech and association. Id. at 362-63.
The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument because he still would have been ineligible for
benefits if he had foregone his First Amendment freedoms and had remained at work. Id. at
364-68. The Court concluded that the state had not withheld anything from him because he
chose not to work. Id. The state merely had refused to subsidize his choice, no matter what the
reason may have been for his choice. Id.
103. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
104. Id. at 450.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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opinion for the Court in Smith distinguished cases of inadvertent
impact on religion such as Smith from cases of deliberate regulation
of religion. 07 In the former cases, according to Justice Scalia,
"prohibiting the exercise of religion... is not the object.., but merely
the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision ... .1,08 In the latter cases, which he noted were extremely
rare, Justice Scalia observed that the regulation "would doubtless be
unconstitutional."0 9 Since the legislative majority rarely sets out
consciously to impose religious orthodoxy by law, and since there was
no implication of any such intent in those cases, the Court's intuitive
classification of the Sherbert-to-Smith line of cases as inadvertent
interference cases seems to have been clearly correct.
The next step in the Clark"10 analysis should be an explicit
assessment of the importance of the legislature's nonreligious
objective and of the availability of alternative measures that would
serve the objective with less impact on religion. This two-part
assessment of the government's nonreligious interest in the
regulation should then be weighed or balanced against an assessment
of the importance to the individual of the restriction on his or her
religiously motivated conduct and the availability of alternative
courses of conduct that would serve the individual's religious purposes
nearly as well as the prohibited conduct.
In fact, what one finds upon close inspection of the Court's
handling of the cases following Clark is that the outcome in each case
appears to have been dictated by one or more of the Clark factors,
although identified only obliquely in the Court's opinion and never
expressly balanced against the other factors. In Sherbert,"' the state
had refused unemployment compensation to a Sabbatarian claimant
who refused to accept an available job that would have required
Saturday work in violation of her religious beliefs. Behind a veil of
strict scrutiny rhetoric, the Court appears to have concluded that the
state's objective in establishing an unemployment compensation
scheme could be served almost as well if religious believers were
exempted from the requirement that they accept work on their day of
religious observance.12 On the other hand, requiring an individual to
accept work on her day of religious worship would constitute a serious
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

494 U.S. at 877-88.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 877.
468 U.S. at 288.
374 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 406-09.
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interference with an important element of traditional religious
beliefs.113 Since no available alternative course of action would serve
the individual's religious purposes, the serious inadvertent
interference with religion outweighed the state's nonreligious
interests in the requirement.
Similarly, the Court in Yoder"1 concluded that the state's
interest in the application of its compulsory high school education
laws to Old Order Amish was outweighed by the serious though
inadvertent interference with Amish religious beliefs and practices.
Although the Court conceded that the state had a substantial interest
in guaranteeing that its citizenry were well educated, and thus
equipped for participation in modern community life, the Court noted
that such an interest was of less importance in the case of Amish
children. 1 5 Amish children would be expected to mature and function
in a technologically simple society for which Amish family home
schooling adequately equipped them." 6 On the other hand, forcing
Amish families to send their children to cosmopolitan high schools
frustrated the Amish family's fundamental religious belief that children should be raised to shun most technological conveniences.1 7 No
alternative course of action was available to the Amish to serve their
religious objectives. In contrast, the state's system of compulsory
education to produce a competent citizenry would be served almost as
well if Amish children were exempted. Thus, an intuitive Clark
analysis led to the conclusion that the inadvertent impact of the compulsory education laws on the Amish religion violated the Free
Exercise Clause.
The same intuitive Clark analysis produced the opposite outcome in Lee, 1 8 Bob Jones University,"9 and Lyng.120 In Lee, the
government's interest in raising tax revenue by applying the social
security tax to an employer who objected to payment on religious
grounds was held sufficient to justify the inadvertent impact on the
employer's religion. 2' Required payment of the tax would flatly
contravene the asserted religious belief and no alternative course of
action short of nonpayment would comport with the employer's
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 404.
406 U.S. at 205.
Id. at 225-29.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 226-27.
455 U.S.at 252.
461 U.S. at 574.
485 U.s. at 439.
455 U.S. at 260-61.
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religious beliefs. Nonetheless, the impact on religion was held to be
outweighed by the government's interest in revenue raising, the
equitable distribution of the tax burden on all employers, including
the religious objector in this case, and the avoidance of the burden of
administering religious exemptions from the tax. 2 2 Although none of
the listed governmental interests, separately or together, approached
what would be considered "compelling" by the usual measure, they
were enough to outweigh the inadvertent impact on religion. A
careful reading of the Court's opinion suggests that the Court simply
was not convinced that nonpayment of the tax was an important or
"central" tenet of the objector's religion. 123 In other words, the
inadvertent but unavoidable impact on religion was minimal, and
thus was easily outweighed by a collection of very ordinary
governmental interests.
In Bob Jones University124 the Court confronted a free exercise
challenge to an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") attempt to withdraw
the tax exempt status of a private religious college because its ban on
interracial dating was considered race discrimination. Bob Jones
University asserted that the ban on interracial dating reflected the
religious tenets of the University, and thus challenged the IRS's
action as a penalty on its free exercise of religion.125 The Court
purported to apply the compelling interest test

26

to this deliberate

regulatory penalty on race discrimination that only inadvertently
impacted on religion because of the peculiar religious belief asserted
by the University. If we are to take the compelling interest test
seriously in this context, it is quite surprising that the Court found a
compelling governmental interest in the dating policies of a small
religious college. On the other hand, it seems apparent that the Court
was not impressed with the University's claim that a ban on
interracial dating was at the center of its more-or-less traditional
body of Christian theological beliefs. In essence, the inadvertent
impact on the religious beliefs and practices of Bob Jones University
was not sufficient to outweigh the government's far-from-compelling
interest in discouraging race discrimination in this isolated segment

122. Id.
123. "Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free
Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising
every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs." Id. at 261.
124. 461 U.S. at 574.
125. Id. at 581-82.
126. Id. at 603-04.
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of society. As Justice Scalia later pointed out in Smith, 12 7 accepting at
face value the Court's assertion that the compelling interest test was
met in this case simply devalues that "test" to the point of near
uselessness.
Finally, in Lyng,128 Justice O'Connor writing for the Court
expressly rejected the compelling interest test or other forms of strict
scrutiny as appropriate methodologies for cases of inadvertent
governmental impact on the free exercise of religion. Lyng presented
a free exercise clause challenge to a United States Forest Service plan
to construct a logging road through, and permit timber harvesting in,
an area of national forest traditionally used by the complaining
Indian tribes for sacred religious rituals. 29 Justice O'Connor's opinion
acknowledged that the tribes' beliefs were sincere and that execution
of the Forest Service's plans would severely damage the tribes'
preferred sites for religious observances. 3 0 Nonetheless, Justice
O'Connor discounted the impact on the religious practices of the
tribes because the road construction would simply force them to use
other locations for their rituals. 3' Because alternative courses of
action were available to serve the religious purposes of the tribes,
though admittedly not as well as the preferred site, the inadvertent
impact on religion was acceptable when measured against the very
ordinary government interests served by the challenged logging
program.
Upon close inspection, the Court's methodology in the free
exercise clause cases prior to Smith appears to be a poorly articulated
and largely intuitive form of the inadvertence jurisprudence that has
32
been much more clearly formulated in the free speech clause cases.
Unfortunately, the Court's failure to articulate a coherent approach
that reflected what it was doing intuitively on a case-by-case basis led
to judicial and scholarly calls simply to abandon the entire line of
33
authority from Sherbert to Lyng as hopelessly inconsistent. Smith
was the almost inevitable result. Ironically, the author of the Court's
opinion in Smith, Justice Scalia, now seeks to rely on his handiwork
in that case as authority for rejecting the much more well-conceived

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
252; Bob
133.

494 U.S. at 888-89.
485 U.S. at 439.
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 454-55.
See, for example, Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205; Lee, 455 U.S. at
Jones University, 461 U.S. at 574; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439.
494 U.S. at 872.
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and articulated Clark methodology for dealing with inadvertence in
free speech cases1 34 The Court simply could not produce a more
backwards result than that.
It can be argued that the Clark methodology is workable in the
free speech context because the Court is capable of assessing the
seriousness of the impact on a particular speaker's ability to communicate and the utility of alternative means by which the speaker can
still disseminate his or her message. On the other hand, the Court
simply cannot assess the importance to the individual of any specific
impairment of religion and cannot, with any confidence, evaluate the
religious utility of alternative courses of action available to the
claimant. 135 While there is considerable force to this argument that
the Clark free speech methodology will be harder to apply in the
context of free exercise of religion claims, it does not follow that we
should abandon the effort altogether.
It seems clear that in applying the Clark methodology in a free
exercise context, the Court inevitably will tend to measure the impact
on minority religion by imposing its own subjective assessment of the
worth of the religious practice in question and probably the worth of
the whole religious belief system that produces the practice in question. In other words, the majoritarian religious assumptions of the
current members of the Court will to some extent dictate the value
attached in the Clark methodology to the impacted religious practice
and to alternative courses of conduct suggested to fill the same religious purpose. Stated more bluntly, the Clark methodology, in the
hands of a religiously mainstream Court, will tend to undervalue and
thus underprotect off-beat minority religions in the face of inadvertent regulatory intrusions. Justice Scalia concludes from such
problems in Smith that we should therefore reject any attempt to
protect minority religions at all in a case of inadvertent impact. 36
Until confronting Justice Scalia's legal legerdemain in Smith, one
confidently would have asserted that a risk of underprotection for a
minority religion was far better than no protection at all.

134. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 578-79 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. See, for example, Perry Dane, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause:
A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 Yale L. J. 350, 360 (1980) (arguing that courts cannot
competently differentiate between activities that are central and those that are peripheral to a

given religion). See also Berg, 39 Vii. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 44).
136. 494 U.S. at 886-87.
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B. The EstablishmentClause
Part II.B of this Article concluded that in each establishment
clause case the Lemon "test" boiled down to a single central question:
Is the inadvertent aid to or apparent endorsement of religion in this
case too much? While Lemon and subsequent cases intuitively ask
the right question (though in a convoluted form), they provide no
guidance at all on how a court should proceed to answer the question
in a specific case. Lemon and subsequent cases supply no frame of
reference for identifying the factors that are relevant to a
determination of "too much" and no analytical structure for
evaluating the import of any factors that might be identified. The
result in each Lemon case unavoidably is a gross, unstructured,
unarticulated, subjective value judgment that the specific instance of
inadvertent "establishment" is or is not "too much." It is little wonder
that case-by-case results obtained by applying the Lemon "test"
appear inconsistent, suggesting that different factors were considered
or that different standards of measurement were applied to the same
factors in each case.
The basic analytical framework of Clark should be explicitly
applied in establishment clause cases to answer the central question
posed, but not answered, by the Lemon "test." Following Clark in a
Lemon case, the Court should ask first (as it does under Lemon)
whether aid 137 to or endorsement of religion was the purpose of the
challenged governmental action or was simply an inadvertent side
effect of a government program designed to pursue a nonreligious
governmental objective. If the aid or endorsement is deliberate, it is a
per se violation of the Establishment Clause. If, however, we find
that aid or apparent endorsement was an unintended effect

138

of a

137. In a case of economic aid to religion, such as providing fire and police protection or
sewer and water service to church property, the first question should be whether the government service somehow aids the religion in a way different from or in excess of the assistance
provided to all other property owners. If the service is provided equally to religious and nonreligious recipients, religion has not in any way been advanced or advantaged over any other
activity. If the aid does not give religion an economic edge or advantage over competing activities, there is in fact no aid at all, deliberate or inadvertent, with which the Establishment
Clause should be concerned. In other words, the Establishment Clause is not implicated by
governmental economic aid universally available to all, including religion. "Aid" in the
establishment clause context must be understood to mean only competitive aid-aid that
advances religion over competing activities or belief systems. It is difficult in this context to
explain why property tax exemptions for church property are not per se violations of the
Establishment Clause. They are best explained as an historic anomaly traceable to misplaced
concerns about equally-applied taxes violating the Free Exercise Clause.
138. See, for example, Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388, where tax deductions for tuition, textbooks,
and transportation expenses incurred for the elementary and secondary education of
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governmental program pursuing nonreligious objectives, we must
decide whether the unintended effect is too much to be permitted
under the Establishment Clause.
Clark suggests that to answer the question posed by these
cases, the Court should explicitly assess the importance of the government's nonreligious objectives in implementing the challenged
program and the alternative courses of action through which the
government might pursue its nonreligious objectives with less
unintended aid to or apparent endorsement of religion. 139 Following
Clark, this two-part assessment of the government's nonreligious
interest in the challenged program should then be weighed or
balanced against an assessment of'the aid or apparent endorsement of
religion that inadvertently results from the government program.
The Court should rehabilitate the besieged Lemon test by refining and rearticulating it to parallel the balancing of interests explicitly required by the Clark methodology. The government program
at issue should be upheld in the face of an establishment clause challenge when a conscious assessment of the three relevant factors suggests that (a) the government's nonreligious objective is significant,
(b) any alternative measure that might entail significantly less aid or
appearance of endorsement would not accomplish the government's
nonreligious objectives nearly as well, and (c) the unavoidable
inadvertent aid or appearance of endorsement of religion is not
substantial. However, the government program should be held to
violate the Establishment Clause when a conscious assessment of the
three factors suggests that (a) the government's nonreligious objective
is not very important, or (b) the objective could be achieved nearly as
effectively by alternative means that would not entail as much
inadvertent aid to or apparent endorsement of religion, and (c) the
inadvertent aid or appearance of endorsement is substantial. If an
effective alternative measure that would entail less aid or appearance
of endorsement is available, it must be substituted for the challenged
program. If no effective alternative is available and the government's
nonreligious objective is insubstantial relative to the amount of
unintended aid to or apparent endorsement of religion, the

dependents appeared to help those who sent children to parochial schools. The state's legitimate primary purpose, however, was to subsidize universal education.
139. The classic Lemon "test" lacks any articulated consideration of the government's nonreligious objectives and of any alternative measures available to the government that would
entail less appearance of endorsement of religion.
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government program must be discontinued and the government's
nonreligious objectives sacrificed.
Assessing the importance of the government's nonreligious
objectives in the challenged program and the availability of alternative government approaches that would entail less aid to or appearance of endorsement of religion is the sort of task that the Court routinely performs.140 Assessing the significance of the aid to or apparent
endorsement of religion admittedly is somewhat more difficult. That,
however, is precisely what the Court has long been inarticulately
required to do in applying the Lemon "test." As noted earlier, the
notions of "primary" effect and "excessive" entanglement are hardly
self-defining. At most, they suggest the need for a determination of
degree by comparison with other imaginable fact patterns. The
Lemon formulation implies that in some cases of unintentional aia,
the aid would not be the "primary" effect of the government program,
but only a lesser, and thus permissible, "secondary" effect.141 In cases
of apparent endorsement by close association between government
agents and religious agents, the inadvertent appearance of endorsement by "entanglement" would in some cases not be "excessive" and
2
thus would be permissible14
Several of the Court's more recent establishment clause cases,
which are sometimes thought to be inconsistent with each other or
with earlier cases, 43 can best be explained as examples of intuitive
Clark analysis poorly articulated in Lemon rhetoric. The doctrinal
centerpiece in this collection of cases is Mueller v. Allen.

44

Mueller

presented an establishment clause challenge to a state income tax
exemption for actual expenses up to $700 incurred for tuition, textbooks, and transportation for the elementary or secondary education
of dependents. Although the deduction was available to all parents,
parents whose children attended public schools did not incur such
expenses. Thus, only parents of private school students were able to
utilize the deduction, and most private school students attended
140. See, for example, Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-97 (observing that a Minnesota tax
"deduction for educational expenses fairly equalizes the tax burden of its citizens and
encourages desirable expenditures for educational purposes"); Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-45 (noting
that the state had a strong interest in education and that the aid program in question
minimized establishment clause concerns).
141. See, for example, Witters, 474 U.S. at 488; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-402; Wolman, 433
U.S. at 242. See Part II.B for a discussion of the Lemon test.
142. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468-69; Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248.
143. See, for example, Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (listing a
series of decisions which Justice Rehnquist views as contradicting each other).
144. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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parochial schools.145 Applying the Lemon rhetoric, Justice Rehnquist
writing for the Court concluded that the tax exemption scheme had a
secular purpose (subsidizing universal education), that the primary
effect was not the advancement of religion, and that the scheme obviously involved little or no "entanglement" through close association
146
between agents of the state and agents of religion.
47
The companion cases of GrandRapids School District v. Ball
and Aguilar v. Felton18 involved state schemes that placed state-paid
public school teachers in parochial schools to conduct secular classes
such as remedial reading. The GrandRapids program also paid parochial school teachers to conduct secular community education classes
Justice
in the parochial school building after school hours.4 9
Brennan's opinions for the Court in both cases concluded that the
state schemes violated the Establishment Clause.
Justice Brennan suggested in Grand Rapids that the public
school teachers might be subtly influenced by their parochial school
surroundings to incorporate religious messages into their secular
classes.15 He was also concerned that the parochial school teachers
might continue to pursue a religious mission in their state-supported
after-hours community education courses on secular topics.' 5' Justice
Brennan, possibly unconvinced of his articulated concern that the
public school teachers would be seduced and corrupted by religion,
went on to articulate what must have been the Court's real concern.
He pointed out that "[g]overnment promotes religion . . . when it
fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities with
those of any-or-all religious denominations .... ,,152 Justice Brennan
characterized the Grand Rapids program as "the symbolic union of
government and religion in one sectarian enterprise. . .. ,,153 This was,
according to Justice Brennan, simply "an impermissible effect under
the Establishment Clause."'
Possibly anticipating Justice Brennan's purported concern
about the corruption of the public school teachers in Grand Rapids,
the state in Aguilar had provided a system of state supervisors to
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 391.
Id. at 394-403.
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
473 U.S. at 376-77.
Id. at 385-87.
Id. at 386-89.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 392.
Id.
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guarantee that the public school teachers working in the parochial
schools would not participate in religious education. 15 Nonetheless,
Justice Brennan found the scheme in Aguilar to be a violation of the
Establishment Clause, relying solely on the entanglement-by-association branch of the Grand Rapids analysis. Indeed, from that perspective, Justice Brennan found the Aguilar scheme even more constitutionally objectionable than the Grand Rapids scheme because the
activities of the state supervisors added a further layer of visible
156
association between agents of the state and agents of religion.
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind 57 presented a challenge to a law authorizing reimbursement for vocational
rehabilitation costs of visually handicapped individuals. An individual recipient had used his state-provided benefits to pay his tuition
for courses at a religious college to prepare him for a career in religious ministry. 58 The case of Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District 59 arose because a deaf student in a parochial high school
requested the assignment of a state-supplied sign-language interpreter for his classroom use. 60 Although the state supplied such
services to students of public schools, the state argued that providing
similar assistance to a student in a parochial school would violate the
Establishment Clause. 161 Thus, both cases involved state aid to a
broad class of disabled individuals, a few of whom chose to use that
assistance to pursue, at least in part, their own religious objectives.
In addition, Zobrest presented the problem of a state employee physically present in the classes of a parochial school, at least somewhat
similar in that respect to the schemes held unconstitutional in Grand
62 In Witters, the Court, in multiple opinions that
Rapids and Aguilar.1
relied heavily on Mueller, found that the state program did not violate
the Establishment Clause. 163 In Zobrest, Justice Rehnquist writing for
the majority relied on the Witters-Mueller line of analysis to uphold
the government program of assisting parochial school students by
supplying sign language interpreters throughout the class day.164
155. 473 U.S. at 406-07.
156. Id. at 413-14.

157. 474 U.s. 481 (1986).
158. Id. at 483.
159. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
160. Id. at 2464.
161. Id.
162. Id. See notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
163. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., writing for the Court); id. at 490 (White, J., concurring); id. at
490-92 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. 113 S. Ct. at 2466-69.

1995]

RELIGION CLAUSE CASES

1379

These five cases, and some earlier cases, 165 are often criticized
because they appear to turn on two factors. 166 The first factor is the
identity of the direct recipients of the aid. If the aid is directed at
individuals who utilize the aid in pursuit of their own religious objectives, the program is more likely to be upheld. In contrast, if the aid
flows directly to the parochial schools, the program is more likely to
be held unconstitutional. The second factor is the breadth or inclusiveness of the class of those eligible to receive the aid. The broader
the class of eligible beneficiaries, the more likely the Court is to sustain the aid scheme in the face of an establishment clause challenge.
In contrast to the criticism often leveled at these decisions, a
Clark analysis suggests that these two factors should largely determine the outcome in such cases and that the Court in fact reached an
appropriate result in each case. The Court quickly and easily concluded in each case that the state's purpose was purely secular 167 and
that any aid to religion or apparent endorsement of religion was an
unintended by-product of the state's pursuit of its secular objective.
The question confronting the Court then in each case was whether the
inadvertent aid to or apparent endorsement of religion was too much
to tolerate under the Establishment Clause. In these cases, any actual aid to religion compared to competing activities was fairly minimal. In cases like Zobrest, 68 Witters, 69 and the earlier case of Everson
v. Board of Education, 70 one can argue that the state aid assisted
some individuals in obtaining religious components, as well as the
intended secular components, of the education.' 71 In Mueller, 72 Grand
Rapids,173 and Aguilar,174 on the other hand, the assistance seemed
well-confined to the nonreligious elements of the education, and much
165. Allen, 392 U.S. at 236 (holding that the state may lend books to parochial school
students); Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229 (holding that the state may not constitutionally lend maps,
magazines, transparencies and other similar instructional materials to parochial schools);
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388 (upholding a system of tax deductions for parents of parochial school
students).
166. See, for example, Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2472-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for relying on two questionable factors in its opinion).
167. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394; Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 383; Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414;
Witters, 474 U.S. at 485; Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
168. 113 S. Ct. at 2462.
169. 474 U.S. at 481.
170. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
171. See, for example, Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that
the functions of secondary education and advancement of religious values were inextricably
intertwined at the institution in question).
172. 463 U.S. at 388.
173. 473 U.S. at 373.
174. 473 U.S. at 402.
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more assistance of that same secular sort already was being provided
to those who chose to attend public schools.
Thus, the real problem confronting the Court in each case was
that the challenged state program would to some degree appear to the
general public to be state support for or endorsement of religion even
though the actual competitive aid175 was minimal or zero. 176 Following
the Clark methodology, albeit intuitively and inarticulately, the Court
was required to assess the extent of this inadvertent appearance of
aid to or endorsement of religion in each case. The two factors that
seemed to influence the Court's analysis, identity of the direct recipients of the aid and breadth of the class of eligible recipients, are the
most central elements in any intelligent assessment of the appearance
of endorsement of religion.
Where individuals, rather than religious institutions, are the
direct recipients of education grants, there is far less appearance of
endorsement of religion, even if a large number of the individual
recipients independently choose to expend their grants on educational
programs with religious components. Furthermore, where all members of a class defined by nonreligious characteristics (e.g., all elementary or secondary students) are eligible for the grants on equal terms,
there is little reason for the general public to draw an inference that
the program is intended to aid or endorse religion. The Court's reliance on these factors is criticized because they are essentially matters
of form. 177 But the appearance of aid or endorsement, i.e., inadvertent
175. See note 137 for a discussion of competitive aid.
176. In Grand Rapids, for example, the Court concluded that "[g]overnment promotes
religion as effectively when it fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities with
those of any--or all-religious denominations as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious
doctrines. If this identification conveys a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is violated." 473 U.S. at 385.
Echoing similar concerns, Justice Blackmun in Zobrest reasoned that the "union of church
and state in pursuit of a common enterprise is likely to place the imprimatur of government
approval upon the favored religion, conveying a message of exclusion to all those who do not
adhere to its tenets." 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
James M. Lewis and Michael L. Vild chronicle the emergence of the endorsement test in the
Court's establishment clause jurisprudence. Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The
Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 671
(1990). The Note locates the test's genesis in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). According to Justice O'Connor, "[t]he purpose prong of the
Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove religion. The
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to
either question should render the challenged practice invalid." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
Eventually, this view attracted a majority of the Court in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, Greater
PittsburghChapter,492 U.S. 573, 594-98 (1989).
177. The Court's opinion in Grand Rapids denounces the "fiction that a... program could
be saved by masking it as aid to individual students." 473 U.S. at 395. The opinion in Wolman
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establishment, is essentially a function of form. The Court's continued emphasis on these factors in inadvertent establishment cases is
entirely appropriate if one recognizes that the Lemon test is simply a
crude and confusingly articulated version of the Clark analysis for
cases of inadvertent effects.
79 the direct and immediate
In Grand Rapids178 and Aguilar1
"recipients" of the state program appeared to be the parochial schools
and parochial school personnel. The Court clearly articulated its
conclusion that the inadvertent endorsement of religion was very
substantial. 18 Unarticulated, but essential to the result in the case,
was the Court's intuitive judgment that the state's secular objectives
were not all that important or (more likely) that they could be accomplished equally well by a program with far less inadvertent entanglement-by-association with religion. Indeed, it is easy to imagine ways
in which the state might equally well have accomplished its objectives
with little or no "entanglement" with religion at all.'8 ' Thus, the inadvertent "establishment" in Grand Rapids and Aguilar outweighed
the state's secular interests in the program.
8
On the other hand, the state benefits in Mueller, 2 Witters,183
and Zobrest'84 were made available to individuals rather than religious institutions and the class of individuals eligible for benefits was
defined broadly by criteria entirely independent of religion. Thus, in
terms of the two central factors, the inadvertent implication of state
endorsement of religion simply was not significant. Unarticulated,
but again necessary to the result in those cases, was an intuitive
judgment by the Court that no readily available alternative approach
would adequately accomplish the state's secular objectives, while
significantly reducing the remaining inadvertent endorsement. Thus,
the state program in each of these cases passed muster under an
intuitive Clark analysis of the establishment clause problem.

asserts that it would "exalt form over substance if this distinction [between loaning equipment
to the pupil or his parent and loaning it directly to the school] were found to justify" a different
result. 433 U.S. at 250.
178. 473 U.S. at 373.
179. 473 U.S. at 402.
180. GrandRapids, 473 U.S. at 397; Aguilar,473 U.S. at 414.
181. For example, the classes in question could have been offered in the public school
building.
182. 463 U.S. at 388.
183. 474 U.S. at 481.
184. 113 S.Ct. at 2462.

1382

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1335

The 1993 case of Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District85 presents what may be the Court's closest approach
to articulating the Clark methodology as a response to an establishment clause claim. In that case, the school board regularly had allowed nonreligious organizations to use school premises during nonschool hours "for social or civic purposes.' 186 The board, however,
refused to allow a church group to use the school facilities during nonschool hours to show a film on parenting and family values. The
Court held that the board's action was viewpoint discrimination that
clearly violated the Free Speech Clause.187
The school board had argued that it must discriminate against
religion (or prohibit all non-school use of the facilities) in order to
avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause.'88 The Court rejected
the anticipated establishment clause challenge to church use of the
school facilities on the grounds that equal access by all users including religious groups would raise "no realistic danger that the community would think that the [School] District was endorsing religion or
any particular creed ... .,"189 In Clark terms, the objective of the government program to aid all social and civic groups, by providing otherwise unused meeting space, 190 was sufficiently important to outweigh the minimal amount of unintended apparent endorsement of
religion that might result.191 Because the Free Speech Clause prohibited operating the aid program while excluding religious groups, there
was no readily available alternative form of the program that would
involve a lower level of apparent endorsement of religion. In short,
the inadvertent endorsement of religion that would result from including religion as an equal participant in the aid program would be
found acceptable when assessed by the Clark methodology.

185. 113 S. Ct. 2141, 124 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1993).

186. Id. at 2147.
187. Id. at 2147-48.
188. Id. at 2148.
189. Id.
190. Allowing the religious use would not constitute competitive aid to religion because all
similar meeting activities, religious and nonreligious, would receive the same level of aid. This
would be a case analogous to fire and police protection for all property owners including
churches. The school board's position in this case was analogous to withholding fire and police
protection from church property because of misguided concerns about the Establishment Clause.
191. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1995),
presents essentially the same set of interrelated issues.
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V. CONCLUSION

It would seem that the development of what might be called a
workable inadvertence jurisprudence for the religion clauses of the
First Amendment is long overdue. Although the Court has come to
perceive the difference between a deliberate impact on religion and an
inadvertent effect on religion in the contexts of both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause, the Court has made little progress beyond that most basic insight.
In the free exercise clause context, the Court for many years
has been engaged in a kind of wandering in the doctrinal wilderness,
unable to bring itself to ask the appropriate next question: "Is the
inadvertent restriction on religion too much?" Because the Court was
unwilling even to ask the question, it provided no articulated methodology for answering the question. Must we assess the importance of
the state's nonreligious regulatory objectives? Should we consider
alternative regulatory schemes available to the state at less cost to
religious freedom? How should we assess the cost to religious freedom? How should we assess the importance of the particular religious practice to the individual practitioner? Should we assess the
importance of the religious exercise from the point of view of organized religious doctrine or in terms of the subjective beliefs of the individual practitioner?
The failure to provide a consistent doctrinal framework within
which to address these questions in the free exercise context has
made it easy to discredit all of the Court's efforts since Sherbert. The
predictable consequence of this, unfortunately, is a complete rejection
of all efforts to protect minority religions from heavy-handed, though
accidental, regulatory restrictions. That, for the time being, is where
192
Smith seems to have left us.

In the establishment clause context, the Court has moved on to
ask, in the confused rhetoric of the Lemon test, the appropriate next
question: "Is the inadvertent aid to or endorsement of religion too
much?" But the Court has provided nearly no guidance at all on how
to approach that question. Too much by what standard? Should aid
or endorsement be assessed from some sort of objective economic
point of view or should it be assessed from the subjective viewpoint of
192. Justice Souter, concurring in Hialeah, expresses "doubts about whether the Smith
rule merits adherence" and argues forcefully that "the Court should re-examine the rule Smith
declared." Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring). See also note 56 suggesting that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act merely reimposes as a statutory matter the inadequate
pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence.
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a casual citizen observer? Should alternative approaches available to
the state be considered?
Here too it has been easy to discredit the work of the Court.
Numerous critics, both on and off the Court, have pointed to the plasticity of the Lemon "test" and the consequent inconsistencies in the
results of its application. 193 Without a conceptual framework to guide
and confine the weighing or balancing required in each case, incoherence and inconsistency inevitably result. Unfortunately, in apparently rejecting the Lemon rhetoric without articulating a substitute,
the Court has moved establishment clause jurisprudence further in
the direction of unrestrained, ad hoc decision-making-not exactly
what one would view as doctrinal progress.
This Article has argued forcefully that the problem of inadvertence in the context of the religion clauses is structurally or conceptually identical to the problem of inadvertence in the free speech context. Thus, the Clark approach to inadvertent interferences with
speech should be utilized to guide and confine the balancing required
in inadvertence cases in the religion clause context.
The questions posed by the use of a Clark analysis in the context of the two religion clauses are not easy questions. Perhaps an
intuitive awareness of their difficulty has prevented the Court for
over 200 years from developing a coherent jurisprudence for the inadvertence problem presented by the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. Surely, however, a serious attempt to articulate and
then address these questions would hold more promise and less frustration than attempting to apply the Court's current doctrinal jumble
to case after case.

193. See, for example, Jeffrey S. Theur, Comment, The Lemon Test and Subjective Intent in
Establishment ClauseAnalysis: The Case for Abandoning the PurposeProng, 76 Ky. L. J. 1061,
1061-75 (1987-88) (arguing that some elements of the Lemon test lead to inconsistent judicial
results, and should be abandoned); Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Comment, Is Lemon a Lemon?:
Crosscurrentsin Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,22 St. Mary's L. J. 129,
155-59 (1990) (arguing that the Lemon test is inherently weak and should be reformulated). See
also note 61.

